Tokdo or Takeshima? The Territorial Dispute Between Japan and the Republic of Korea by Sibbett, Benjamin K.
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 21, Issue 4 1997 Article 9
Tokdo or Takeshima? The Territorial Dispute
Between Japan and the Republic of Korea
Benjamin K. Sibbett∗
∗
Copyright c©1997 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
Tokdo or Takeshima? The Territorial Dispute
Between Japan and the Republic of Korea
Benjamin K. Sibbett
Abstract
This Note analyzes Japan’s and the Republic of Korea’s competing claims to Liancourt in
light of traditional public international law, specifically the 1982 Convention and customary law
found in past decisions by the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) and arbitral bodies (collec-
tively “international adjudicatory bodies”). Part I of this Note provides not only a brief historical
overview on Japanese-Korean relations, but also a detailed review of relevant public international
law. It outlines important provisions of the 1982 Convention, discusses widely-recognized means
of territorial acquisition, and summarizes relevant decisions of international adjudicatory bodies.
Part II examines each country’s claim to Liancourt. The third and final part argues that according
to current public international law, the Republic of Korea establishes a superior claim to Liancourt
than does Japan. Accordingly, this Note concludes that the Republic of Korea should become
Liancourt’s sovereign.
TOKDO OR TAKESHIMA? THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE
BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Benjamin K. Sibbett*
"Rarely have the tempers of ostensible allies flared so greatly
over such insignificant real estate."1
INTRODUCTION
With the' introduction of the 1982 United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea 2 ("UNCLOS III" or "1982 Conven-
J.D. Candidate, 1999, Fordham University School of Law.
1. Islets Issue Must Be Put Back on Shelf, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, Feb. 29, 1996, § Asia
Focus, at 11.
2. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS III].
The first United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea convened in 1958 in Ge-
neva, Switzerland and resulted in the following four conventions ("1958 Conventions"):
1) the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 2) the Convention
on the High Seas, 3) the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Re-
sources of the High Seas, and 4) the Convention on the Continental Shelf. See, e.g.,
D.C. KAPOOR & ADAM J. KERR, A GUIDE TO MARITIME BOUNDARY DELIMITATION 5-6
(1986) (summarizing history of international community efforts to codify law of sea
including attempts by League of Nations, Hague Conference of 1930, International Law
Commission, and first United Nations Convention on Law of Sea that resulted in 1958
Conventions); Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958,
15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13
U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 11; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.ST. 138, 559 U.N.T.S. 285; Convention
on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311. As of Decem-
ber 31, 1996, the status of the 1958 Conventions was as follows: Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 42 Signatories and 51 Parties (in force)'; Conven-
tion on the High Seas, 47 Signatories and 62 Parties (in force); Convention on Fishing
and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas, 36 Signatories and 37 Parties
(in force); and the Convention on the Continental Shelf, 44 Signatories and 57 Parties
(in force). MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, STATUS AS
OF 31 DECEMBER 1996 801, 807, 813, 815 (1997) [hereinafter MULTILATERAL TREATIES];
TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1997 394-95, 366 (1997). The second United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea convened in 1960 but failed by one vote. See,
e.g., KAPOOR & KERR, supra at 6 (noting that second Convention on Law of Sea at-
tempted to clarify issues left unresolved by 1958 Conventions regarding, inter alia,
breadth of territorial sea and fisheries zone). Finally, the third United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea opened for signature on December 10, 1982. See id. at 7-8
(tracing efforts since 1960 Convention, largely motivated by newly-independent states
that felt compelled by 1958 Conventions to which they did not consent, to compile
comprehensive review of law of sea that resulted in UNCLOS III's first conference in
1973).
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tion"), sovereignty3 over offshore territory4 has become increas-
ingly important.5 Parties to UNCLOS III are entitled to as much
as 200 nautical miles6 of various maritime and jurisdictional ex-
clusivity. 7 Moreover, states that have established sovereignty over
UNCLOS III prevails over the 1958 Conventions. See UNCLOS III, supra note 2,
art. 311(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1327 (providing that ["tihis Convention shall prevail, as be-
tween States Parties, over the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea of 29 April
1958."). UNCLOS III signatories, however, are free to make agreements modifying the
1982 Convention as it relates to their bilateral relations. Id. art. 311(3), 21 I.L.M. at
1327. In addition, UNCLOS III does not alter signatories' rights and obligations arising
from other agreements compatible with UNCLOS III as long as the agreements do not
affect other signatories' enjoyment of their rights and obligations under UNCLOS IlI.
Id. art. 311(2), 21 I.L.M. at 1327.
3. See, e.g., Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Apr. 4, 1928)
[hereinafter Island of Palmas] (stating that "sovereignty in relation to a portion of the
surface of the globe is the legal condition necessary for the inclusion of such portion in
the territory of any particular State."). In Island of Palmas, the Permanent Court of
Arbitration ("PCA") explained that sovereignty signifies independence in relation to
other states and that this independence gives the sovereign the right to exercise state
functions to the exclusion of any other state. Id. As regards territorial sovereignty, the
PCA stated:
Territorial sovereignty is, in general, a situation recognized and delimited
in space, either by so-called natural frontiers as recognised by international
law or by outward signs of delimitation that are undisputed, or else by legal
engagements entered into between interested neighbours, such as frontier
conventions, or by acts of recognition of States within fixed boundaries.
Id.
4. See, e.g., HIRAN W. JAYEWARDENE, THE REGIME OF ISLANDS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,
xxi (1990) (listing features like islands, islets, rocks, shoals, reefs, low-tide elevations,
atolls, archipelagos, and artificial islands).
5. Compare Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, supra note 2,
art. 10, 15 U.S.T. at 1609-10, 516 U.N.T.S. at 212 (failing to grant any maritime jurisdic-
tion to offshore territory except island entitlement to territorial sea), with UNCLOS III,
supra note 2, arts. 55-8, 121, 21 I.L.M. at 1280, 1291 (granting maritime jurisdiction in
form of territorial sea, contiguous zone, and exclusive economic zone to islands and, in
some cases, rocks).
6. See WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICrIONARY 1198 (2d ed. 1983) (de-
fining nautical mile as "unit of linear measure for ships and aircraft, equal to ... about
6,080 ft."); INTERNATIONAL LAW 979, n.2 (Barry E. Carter & Phillip R. Trimble eds., 2d
ed. 1995) (stating that one nautical mile equals 1.151 miles); RANDOM HOUSE WEB-
STER'S DICTIONARY 440 (1993) (setting forth that one nautical mile is equal to 1.852
kilometers).
7. See UNCLOS III, supra note 2, arts. 2-33, 55-75, 21 I.L.M. at 1272-76, 1280-84
(governing territorial sea, contiguous zone, and exclusive economic zone). Maritime
or jurisdictional exclusivity refers to the rights, jurisdiction, and duties of states in the
territorial sea, contiguous zone, and exclusive economic zone ("EEZ"). See id. (defining
states' rights, jurisdictions, and duties such as administering passage of ships and ex-
ploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing living and non-living natural resources).
UNCLOS III defines the territorial sea as follows:
1. The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and
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offshore territory may be entitled to additional exclusivity.' As a
result, the outcome of maritime boundary disputes often de-
pends on the ownership and classification of such features as an
island or a rock.9
Disputes over offshore territory in Central East Asia are
ubiquitous' ° and have proven difficult to resolve.11 Surrounded
internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic
waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to
its bed and subsoil.
3. The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to this Conven-
tion and to other rules of international law.
Id. art. 2, 21 I.L.M. at 1272. The territorial sea may not exceed 12 nautical miles. Id.
art. 3, 21 I.L.M. at 1272.
UNCLOS III defines the contiguous zone as follows:
1. In a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, described as the contiguous zone,
the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to:
(a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws
and regulations within its territory or territorial sea;
(b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed
within its territory or territorial sea.
2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
Id. art. 33, 21 I.L.M. at 1276.
UNCLOS III defines an EEZ as "an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea
.... Id. art. 55, 21 I.L.M. at 1280. EEZs provide coastal states with various sovereign
rights over living and non-living resources. Id. arts. 56-7, 21 I.L.M. at 1280 (defining
EEZ breadth as no greater than 200 nautical miles and outlining coastal state rights,
jurisdiction, and duties such as protecting and preserving marine environment). The
EEZ originated in two previous concepts-the continental shelf regime and fisheries
regime. See e.g., Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 2, arts. 1-3, 15 U.S.T.
at 473, 499 U.N.T.S. at 312-14 (recognizing coastal state sovereignty over natural re-
sources of continental shelf such as "mineral and other non-living resources of the sea-
bed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species . . .");
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note 2 arts. 1-2, 15
U.S.T. at 1608, 516 U.N.T.S. at 206-08 (granting coastal states sovereignty over territo-
rial sea although breadth was undefined); Convention on the High Seas, supra note 2,
art. 2, 13 U.S.T. at 2314, 450 U.N.T.S. at 82-84 (defining freedom of high seas to in-
clude freedom of fishing); Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Re-
sources of the High Seas, supra note 2, art. 1, 17 U.S.T. at 140, 559 U.N.T.S. at 286-88
(recognizing states' rights to engage in fishing high seas).
8. See UNCLOS III, supra note 2, art. 121(2), 21 I.L.M. at 1291 (setting forth that
["e]xcept as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory.").
9. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, Central East Asian Maritime Boundaries and the Law
of the Sea, 89 AM. J. INr'L L. 724, 727-29 (1995) (discussing impact of offshore territory
on maritime boundaries in East Asian Sea although territories are often relatively
small).
10. See, e.g., Kendrick F. Royer, Note, Japan's East China Sea Ocean Boundaries: What
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by eleven nations, Central East Asia's seas are relatively small.1 2
History has shown the area to be an ambitious arena for compet-
ing claims to offshore sovereignty.' Japan's dispute with the Re-
public of Korea concerning the Liancourt Rocks 4 ("Liancourt")
Solutions Can a Confused Legal Environment Provide in a Complex Boundary Dispute?, 22
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 581, 585-96 (1989) (describing and addressing situation in East
China Sea regarding various boundary disputes between Japan, China, Taiwan, and
South Korea concerning, for example, continental shelf, Senkaku islands, Danjo Gunto
and Tori Shima islands, and Ryukyu islands).
11. See, e.g., 8 L. SEA INST. WORKSHOP 3 (1987) [hereinafter WORKSHOP] (discussing
different legal problems of implementing UNCLOS III in East Asian disputes); see also
Charney, supra note 9, at 725 (mentioning generality and indeterminate nature of UN-
CLOS III articles and consequent difficulty in its application).
12. See, e.g., Charney, supra note 9, at 724 (describing Central East Asia as area
encompassing South China Sea, East China Sea, Sea of Japan, and Yellow Sea, that is
surrounded by People's Republic of China, Taiwan (Republic of China), Japan, North
and South Korea, Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Russia).
13. See Choon-ho Park, The South China Sea Disputes: Who Owns the Islands and the
Natural Resources, 5 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 27 (1978) (concentrating on Spratly Islands
dispute between People's Republic of China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, Brunei, and
Philippines concerning chain of small islets, rocks, reefs, and atolls in South China Sea
that are coveted for possible mineral and petroleum reserves). Additional disputed
areas include the Paracel Islands (Xisha) in the South China Sea that are claimed by
China, Taiwan, and Vietnam; the Kuril (Northern) Islands in Sea of Japan that are
claimed by Japan and Russia; and the Senkaku (Dioayuta, Tiao-yu-tai) Islands (Gunto)
in the East China Sea. See Charney, supra note 9, at 725-28 (arguing that UNCLOS Il1,
changes in political relations between littoral states, and advancement of international
maritime boundary law have all impacted maritime boundary delimitation in Central
East Asia).
14. See, e.g., Kazuo Hori, Japan's Incorporation of Takeshima into Its Territory in 1905,
28 KOREA OBSERVER 477, 488 (1997) (stating that French vessel renamed Takeshima/
Tokdo in 1849 calling it Liancourt); Yong-Ha. Shin, A Historical Study of Korea's 7itle to
Tokdo, 28 KOREA OBSERVER 333, 348 (1997) (maintaining that French warship named
Liancourt christened Takeshima/Tokdo Liancourt Rocks in 1849).
Japan describes Liancourt as- "a pair of islands and numerous small reefs in the
surrounding water 85 nautical miles northwest of the Oki Island, Shimane Prefecture.
The combined area of the two main islands, the East Island (Onnajima) and the West
Island (Otokojima), at 0.23 square kilometers is just about the size of the Hibiya Park in
Tokyo." Takeshima, Document Received from the Japanese Mission to the United Na-
tions, New York, N.Y. (Feb. 6, 1998) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal);
see Japan Protests to Seoul at Construction on Island, REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, Nov. 1, 1996,
BC Cycle (stating that Liancourt has total area of approximately 58 acres); WORKSHOP,
supra note 11, at 138 (noting Liancourt's location as west of Republic of Korea and
north of southern-most portion ofJapanese island Honshu); Hideki Kajimura, The Ques-
tion of Takeshima/Tokdo, 28 KOREA OBSERVER 423, 433 (1997) (maintaining that
Liancourt's location as approximately 13111 east longitude and roughly 37 north lati-
tude). The Republic of Korea states, "Tokdo comprises two main islets, Tongdo on the
east and Sodo on the west. Tongdo is 99.4 meters above sea level and Sodo, 174 meters.
Including a reef, Tokdo's total area is 186,173 square meters." TAE-JEONG KIM, KOREAN
OVERSEAS INFORMATION SERVICE, WILD FLOWERS OF Toi'no ISLAND, KOREA 8 (1996). By
analogy, Liancourt is approximately half the size of Vatican City in Southern Europe.
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in the Sea of Japan 15 exemplifies one such claim. 6
In early 1996, the Republic of Korea's foreign ministry an-
nounced that Liancourt had always belonged to the Republic of
Korea. 7 In June 1997, Japan's foreign ministry countered that
Liancourt belonged, and had always belonged, to Japan.i" This
Note analyzes these two countries' competing claims to
Liancourt in light of traditional public international law, specifi-
cally the 1982 Convention and customary law 9 found in past de-
See Holy See (Vatican City) (visited Mar. 10, 1998) <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publica-
tions/nsolo/factbook/vt-l.htm> (also on file with the Fordham International Law Journal)
(explaining that Vatican City's total land area is 0.44 square kilometers).
One Korean author describes Liancourt as a group of volcanic rocks upon which
there could be no permanent dwelling. See Kajimura, supra at 433-34 (summarizing
natural condition of Liancourt as rocky with little sand or soil and subject to typhoons
and crashing waves). The same author reports an existing water well on Sodo that
could be used for drinking, as well as various plants, shrubs, weeds, and herbs. See id. at
434 (characterizing water and vegetation situation and pointing out that Korean fisher-
men use rain water for cooking and normally bring drinking water from mainland).
The author states that Liancourt "is absolutely not a place which can be cultivated" and
is low in commercial value. Id. at 435.
15. THE HISTORICAL PRECEDENT FOR THE "EAST SEA", THE SOCIETY FOR EAST SEA,
DEPARTMENT OF GEOGRAPHY EDUCATION COLLEGE OF EDUCATION SEOUL NATIONAL UNI-
vERSIY. The Republic of Korea's position is that the East Sea was unjustifiably and
improperly renamed the Sea ofJapan by the International Hydrographic Organization.
See id. (reviewing historical background of name "East Sea," detailing renaming process
of 1929 International Hydrographic Organization from which Korean representatives
remained absent, and summarizing Korean efforts to reinstate term East Sea on world
maps).
16. See e.g., Charney, supra note 9, at 728 (noting difficulty of maritime delimita-
tion in seas adjacent to Central East Asia, focusing specifically on territorial disputes
over islands and other small features).
17. Press Conference with Japanese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Nobuaki Tanaka
(June 3, 1997) (visited Feb. 2, 1998) <http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/1997/6/
603.html#2> (stating that "Takeshima Island is an integral part of Japanese territory
and this has been our long-standing position on Takeshima Island. There is no ques-
tion about this.").
18. See South Korea Brushes off Japanese Protests over Disputed Islets, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Feb. 9, 1996 available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database (stating that "'Tokdo
is our territory, historically and under international law.'").
19. See, e.g., I.A. SHEARER, STARKE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 31-37 (11th ed. 1994) (ex-
plaining that customary rules surface in international organs, diplomatic relations be-
tween states, state laws, decisions of state courts, and state military or administrative
practices). Customary international law consists of rules that evolved over time and
eventually became recognized by the international community. Id. The Third Restate-
ment of the Foreign Relations Law defines customary international law as "result[ing]
from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(2) (1987). The Statute of the International Court of Justice defines cus-
tomary international law as "international custom, as evidence of a general practice
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cisions by the International Court of Justice 20 ("ICJ") and arbi-
accepted as law .... " Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art.
38(1)(b), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1179, 1187 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. All Mem-
bers of the United Nations are ipsofacto parties to the ICJ Statute. U.N. CHARTER art. 93,
para 1.
Prior to the recent codifications, the law of the sea functioned largely on the basis
of custom. Hugo Caminos & Michael R. Molitor, Perspectives on the New Law of the Sea:
Progressive Development ofInternationalLaw and the Package Deal, 79 AM.J. Ir'L L. 871, 871
(1985). Customs developed over time due to uniform state practice that was consist-
ently observed and considered obligatory in most instances. Id. UNCLOS III, in large
part, reflects the development of custom and state practice. Id. Thus, the relationship
between customary international law and its codification in multilateral treaties as it
relates to the 1982 Convention may be stated as follows:
The 1982 Convention may:
1. reinforce traditional customary law of the sea by repeating rules embodied
in the 1958 Law of the Sea Conventions;
2. foster new customary law by giving written expression to customary law that
has developed since 1958, often in contradiction to the 1958 Conventions;
or
3. direct the development of future customary law of the sea by giving expres-
sion to concepts not yet accepted as customary law but which are likely to
become part of that law.
John King Gamble, Jr. & Maria Frankowska, The 1982 Convention and Customary Law of
the Sea: Observations, a Framework, and a Warning, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 491, 492 (1984).
"Without a doubt, the above enumeration correctly depicts the traditional method of
determining the relationship between the 1982 Convention and customary interna-
tional law." Caminos & Molitor, supra, at 873.
20. See U.N. CHARTER art. 92 (declaring that International Court of Justice ("ICJ")
shall be United Nation's principal judicial organ). The ICJ is only one forum for resolv-
ing boundary disputes between states. See, e.g., Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3) [hereinafter Libyan] (determin-
ing boundary of frontier between Republic of Chad and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya). "Ow-
ing to the relative scarcity of authoritative pronouncements, ICJjudgments and even ad
hoc arbitration awards generally assume considerable importance in international law."
Jonathan I. Charney, Progress in International Maritime Boundary Delimitation Law, 88 AM.
J. ITrr'L L. 227, 227 (1994). The Statute of the International Court of Justice, however,
eliminates the doctrine of stare decisis in international adjudications. See ICJ Statute,
supra note 19, art. 59, 59 Stat. at 1062, 3 Bevans at 1190 (announcing that ["t]he deci-
sion of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that
particular case."). One maritime law expert argues that maritime boundary decisions
form a classic common law upon which states may rely. See Charney, supra, at 228 (ex-
plaining that ICJ and arbitral bodies have defined methods of analyzing maritime
boundary disputes and have limited relevant considerations that may be accounted for
when determining the boundary). Thus, although UNCLOS III codifies international
maritime boundary law, its indeterminate nature necessitates effective third-party dis-
pute settlement capability. Id.
Consequently, Part XV of UNCLOS III provides a complicated yet comprehensive
dispute settlement system that includes additional dispute settlement fora to the ICJ.
UNCLOS III, supra note 2, arts. 279-99, 21 I.L.M. at 1322-26; seeJohn King Gamble, Jr.,
The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: Binding Dispute Settlement?, 9 B.U. INT'L L.J.
39, 43 (1991) (detailing UNCLOS III's dispute settlement sections and advocating a
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tral bodies (collectively "international adjudicatory bodies"),.
Part I of this Note provides not only a brief historical overview
on Japanese-Korean relations, but also a detailed review of rele-
vant public international law. It outlines important provisions of
the 1982 Convention, discusses widely-recognized means of terri-
torial acquisition, and summarizes relevant decisions of interna-
tional adjudicatory bodies. Part II examines each country's
claim to Liancourt. The third and final part argues that accord-
ing to current public international law, the Republic of Korea
establishes a superior claim to Liancourt than does Japan. Ac-
cordingly, this Note concludes that the Republic of Korea should
become Liancourt's sovereign.
single organizational approach as opposed to more confusing provisioning of UNCLOS
III); see generally Louis B. Sohn, Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in Ocean Conflicts: Does UN-
CLOS III Point the Way? 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 195 (1983) (recognizing that
comprehensive dispute settlement provisions would eliminate difficulties associated
with unilateral interpretation of UNCLOS III such as instability, unpredictability, and
deadlock). Generally speaking, UNCLOS III provides the following dispute settlement
options that can be exercised at signing, ratification, or accession:
(a) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established in accord-
ance with Annex VI;
(b) the International Court of Justice;
(c) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII;
(d) a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII for
one or more of the categories of disputes specified therein.
UNCLOS III, supra note 2, art. 287(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1322-23. Under UNCLOS III, par-
ties to a dispute select any settlement method desired as long as the method is peaceful.
Id. arts. 279-80, 21 I.L.M. at 1322. Article 281(1), however, provides that if parties to a
dispute are unable to agree on a method, then the procedures outlined in Part XV of
UNCLOS III apply. Id. art. 281(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1322. Article 281(1) states:
If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the inter-
pretation or application of this Convention have agreed to seek settlement of
the dispute by a peaceful means of their own choice, the procedures provided
for in this Part apply only where no settlement has been reached by recourse
to such means and the agreement between the parties does not exclude any
further procedure.
Id. If the parties to a dispute have not selected the same forum, then the dispute must
be submitted to arbitration unless otherwise agreed. Id. art. 287(5), 21 I.L.M. at 1323.
Litigators will likely face problems deciding among the various settlement fora. See Ger-
ald A. Malia, The New "International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea": Prospects for Dispute
Resolution at the "Sea Court", 7 GEO. INT'L ENVrL. L. REv. 791, 792 (1995) (addressing
new tribunal for law of sea dispute resolution and recognizing difficult choice facing
litigators in that although arbitration is usually cheap and fast, it is often unsatisfactory).
21. See, e.g., J.L. SIMPSON & HAZEL Fox, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND
PRACTICE 1-24 (1959) (tracing development of public arbitration since 1794, paying spe-
cific attention to 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conferences from which Permanent
Court of Arbitration was established which' consists of list of names from which arbiters
may be selected).
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I. JAPANESE-KOREAN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
It is difficult to understand contemporary Japanese-Korean
relations without considering the past.2 2 Koreans feel an emo-
tional need to anchor their modern-day policies to recollections
of former Japanese misconduct.23 Conversely, the Japanese
would prefer concentrating on the present and replacing the
past with a new relationship.24
The current dispute over Liancourt illustrates these anti-
thetical approaches. 2  If or when a third-party adjudges the
question of Liancourt's sovereign, public international law will
undoubtedly influence the outcome.2 6 Consequently, an objec-
tive application of international law limits the position Korean
and Japanese litigators or diplomats may tenably assume when
presenting the dispute to a third-party for settlement.2 7
A. Historical Perspective
Japanese-Korean relations are paradoxical.2 8 Japan and Ko-
rea are similar geographically and culturally,29 yet their past casts
22. BRIAN BRIDGES, JAPAN AND KOREA IN THE 1990s: FROM ANTAGONISM TO ADJUST-
MENT 163 (1993).
23. See id. (explaining that concept of han, representing combination of resent-
ment, regret, and renewed suffering, controls how many Koreans reflect on past and
often stimulates desires to revive past events as calculated bargaining postures when
dealing with Japanese business and government).
24. See id. (explaining thatJapan often dismisses Korean references to past as con-
scious tactical decision-making to secure Japanese concessions without recognizing de-
gree to which Koreans actually feel thatJapan has not taken responsibility for past trans-
gressions).
25. Compare Takeshima, supra note 14 (setting forth Japan's policy of resolving
Liancourt dispute peacefully and without incident), with Hoon Lee, Dispute over Territo-
rial Ownership of Tokdo in the Late Choson Period, 28 KOREA OBSERVER 389, 390 (1997)
(noting Republic of Korea's view that Liancourt has always belonged to Korea and,
therefore, is simply not subject to dispute).
26. See Derek Bowett, Islands, Rocks, Reefs, and Low-Tide Elevations in Maritime Bound-
ary Delimitations, in INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES 131-32 (Jonathan I. Charney
& Lewis M. Alexander eds., 1993) (arguing that international law is extremely relevant
to voluntary maritime boundary settlements because jurisprudential developments in
this area influence interstate negotiations).
27. See Charney, supra note 20, at 228 (arguing that because diplomats are aware
that resort to third-party dispute settlement is real possibility in maritime boundary dis-
putes, awareness limits credible positions by devaluing those that would be untenable to
third party).
28. CHONG-SIK LEE, JAPAN AND KOREA: THE POLITIcAL DIMENSION 1 (1985).
29. See id. at 1 (noting geographic proximity, similar thinking, and behavior pat-
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an enduring shadow on the present." Thus, one writer attrib-
utes the Liancourt dispute to historical differences rather than a
desire for money or territory.3
Japanese and Koreans interacted long before Japan and Ko-
rea emerged as political entities.3 2 Between the early-fifteenth
and early-nineteenth centuries, national characteristics such as
Japan's military prowess and Korea's attitude of moral superior-
ity highlighted Japanese-Korean relations.3 3 Japan's pragmatic
approach, however, overpowered Korea's Confucian idealism.34
As a consequence, each country disguised its communications
with the other to avoid impeding diplomatic progress.35
As Western expansionism heightened during the nine-
teenth century, Korea developed a seclusionary external policy.
36
terns that stem from same cultural heritage, language similarities because Japanese and
Korean share same syntax and are largely based on Chinese, and interdependence on
trade and import/export).
30. See, e.g., BRIDGES, supra note 22, at 1 (explaining that Japan's colonial occupa-
tion of Korea only intensified long-standing enmity between Korea and Japan dating
back several decades).
31. Michael A. Lev, A Point of Contention in the Sea ofJapan: Seoul Testily Asserts Old
Claim, CHI. TRmB., Mar. 4, 1996. Addressing the disagreement over Liancourt, this writer
hypothesizes,
In one sense, the disagreement over the island-called Takeshima by Ja-
pan-is about money. As governments remap their borders according to the
latest version of the international law of the sea, owning the island would
mean the chance to claim exclusive fishing and mineral rights in the area.
But in a deeper sense, it matters very little where the island is, what it
looks like or whether there is good fishing nearby.
The argument isn't about ownership; it's about history, a previous war
and what Koreans emotionally consider to be unfinished business with Japan.
Id.
32. See e.g., BRIDGES, supra note 22, at 7 (detailing Japanese and Korean interaction
in form of travels and migrations during fourth and seventh centuries).
33. ETSUKO HAE-JIN KANG, DIPLOMACY AND IDEOLOGY IN JAPANESE-KOREAN RELA-
TIONS 223 (1997).
34. See id. (noting that Korea's moralistic approach proved unsuccessful in con-
junction with Japan's attitude of militaristic and economic advancement). The author
contends that Japan and Korea were on equal ground diplomatically in that the Japa-
nese shoguns and Korean kings exchanged state letters and culture. Id. Japan and
Korea clashed ideologically, however, because each claimed its own centrality. Id. In
reference to the countries' diplomatic and ideological relations, the author cites Hans
Morgenthau who stated, "all politics are invariably associated with the pursuit of power,
and ideologies serve as a justifying tool as well as a mask of power politics." Id.
35. See id. (concluding that self-centered and fictitious diplomatic ideologies re-
sulted in concealment of true state of affairs between Japan and Korea in diplomatic
intercourse).
36. Id. at 227-30. Because of its perfunctory external intercourse with the outside
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Conversely, Japan adopted an expansionist external policy. 37 Ja-
pan's imperialist appetite culminated in its colonial occupation
of Korea from 1910 to 1945.38 During this time, Japan impelled
Koreans to speak Japanese, adopt Japanese names and Japan's
state religion, and sacrifice enormous educational opportunity.39
The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty4 ° forced Japan to rec-
ognize Korea's independence at the close of World War ll.41
Shortly thereafter, Korea declared its sovereignty over a portion
of the sea by setting up the so-called Rhee Line"2 that included the
waters surrounding Liancourt.4' This declaration sparked the
modern-day controversy between Japan and the Republic of Ko-
rea over Liancourt.44
B. Public International "Lazw
The sea, occupying two-thirds of the world's surface, has al-
ways been a source of food and a means of communication,
travel, and trade.45 With technological advancements such as
modem drilling machinery and shipbuilding capabilities, the sea
is an increasingly lucrative. source of natural resources and mari-
world, Korea was known as the "Hermit Kingdom" until the late-nineteenth century.
WOONSANG CHOI, THE DIPLOMArIc HISTORY OF KOREA 1-2 (1987).
37. See e.g., LEE, supra note 28, at 3 (setting forth that political upheaval of 1868
Meiji Restoration jolted Japan out of its seclusion and resulted in Japan's expansionist
policies).
38. See e.g., BRIDGES, supra note 22, at 7-9 (outlining Japanese intervention in Korea
including Russo-Japanese War and subsequent establishment. ofJapanese residency-gen-
eral held by Ito Hirobumi, a veteran politician). One author details Korea's reaction to
Japan's occupation as follows: .
Korea had watched with repugnance the Japanese attempt to emulate the
West, taking it as-proof of Japanese perfidy against the very essence of Eastern
culture and tradition. When the Japanese applied the strength they had
gained by learning Western technology to the conquest of Korea, the Koreans
could not have been more humiliated.
LEE, supra note 28, at 3.
39. See e.g., BRIDGES, supra note 22, at 8 (explaining that Japan tried to minimize
Korea's national identity).
40. SeeTreaty of Peace withJapan, Sept. 8, 1951, art. 2(a), 3 U.S.T. 3169, 3172, 136
U.N.T.S. 45, 48 (stating "Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all
right, title and claim to Korea .
41. Id.
42. See Kajimura, supra note 14, at 463 (highlighting Korea's Declaration of Mari-
time Sovereignty in January 18, 1952 that set up Korea's territorial boundaries to pro-
tect Korean fishermen).
43. Id.
44. Lee, supra, note 25, at 389.
45. D.W. BowErr, THE LAW OF THE SEA 1 (1967).
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time research opportunities.46 International efforts, therefore,
focus on minimizing inequitable exploitation of the sea.47 To
this end, public international law has produced multilateral trea-
ties and organizations such as the 1982 Convention, the United
Nations, the International Maritime Organization,48 and the In-
ternational Seabed Authority49 as well as international customary
law promulgated by international adjudicatory bodies."
1. UNCLOS III
In 1958, the original United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea 51 convened in Geneva, Switzerland to codify the
46. See, e.g., Alexander Yankov, A Historic Opportunity for the United Nations Law of the
Sea Convention, in ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 15-27 (Myron
H. Nordquist & John Norton Moore eds., 1995) (listing several improvements of UN-
CLOS III to help protect against inequitable results of technological advancement and
maritime exploitation); COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 95TH
CONG., THE THIRD U.N. LAw OF THE SEA CONFERENCE 9 (Comm. Print 1978) [hereinaf-
ter 95TH CONG. LOSC] (articulating several modern-day advancements and technolo-
gies that necessitated additional maritime regulation).
47. See 95TH CONG. LOSC, supra note 46, at 3-18 (tracing development of law of sea
from Grotius (1625), who argued that oceans were inherently indivisible and inexhaust-
ible, through mid-20th century when United Nations General Assembly was charged
with furthering international law's codification, to current 1958, 1960, and 1982 Con-
ventions on law of sea).
48. Convention on the International Maritime Consultative Organization, Mar. 6,
1948, 9 U.S.T. 621, 289 U.N.T.S. 48. The International Maritime Organization
("IMO"), originally known as the International Maritime Consultative Organization, is a
principal forum and international legislative body for most maritime matters. See e.g.,
CLEOPATRA ELMIRA HENRY, THE CARRIAGE OF DANGEROUS GOODS BY SEA: THE ROLE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 49 (1985)
(demonstrating, by analyzing IMO's contribution to international rules of maritime
transport, that international legislation may occur even without formally-recognized in-
ternational legislators). The IMO "is also a cornerstone" of UNCLOS III. MarkJ. Yost,
International Maritime Law & The U.S. Admiralty Lawyer: A Current Assessment, 7 U.S.F.
MAR. LJ. 313, 320 (1995). Indeed, the "'competent international organization,"' as
used in UNCLOS III, is intended to refer to the IMO. Id. Additionally, references to
"'generally accepted international rules or standards' include those developed by and
through IMO." Id.
49. See UNCLOS III, supra note 2, art. 156, 21 I.L.M. at 1298 (establishing Interna-
tional Seabed Authority). The International Seabed Authority's primary function is to
administer the activity affecting the resources of the deep seabed "for the benefit of
mankind as a whole." Id. art. 140(1), 157(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1293, 1298.
50. See SHEARER, supra note 19, at 7-14 (explaining origins and development of
present-day international law as product of 400 years evolving from modern European
states and 16th, 17th, and 18th-century jurists to 19th and 20th-century international
adjudicatory bodies and multilateral treaties due to rise of powerful new states, modern-
ization of world transport, and increasing inventions and technologies).
51. 1958 Conventions, supra note 2.
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existing law on the sea and to address the issue of conflicting
state and community interests,. 2 According to various scholars,
the 1958 Conventions failed to resolve the reach of not only the
territorial sea,5" but also of any exclusive fishery zones 54 and ex-
clusive economic zones ("EEZ"). In addition, subsequent
political and scientific developments necessitated a reexamina-
tion of the existing law ofethe sea.56 For these reasons, the third
52. BowETr, supra note 45, at 14. Scholars have said,
[tihe historic function of the law of the sea has long been recognized as that
of protecting and balancing the common interests, inclusive and exclusive, of
all peoples in the use and enjoyment of the oceans, .whilst rejecting all egocen-
tric assertions of special interests in contravention of general community inter-
ests.
MYREs S. MCDOUGALL & WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS: A CON-
TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 1 (1987).
53. See UNCLOS III, supra note 2, arts. 24, 21 I.L.M. at 1272 (defining territorial
sea as coastal state sovereignty over air space, seabed, and seabed subsoil extending no
farther than 12 nautical miles).
54. See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 2, art. 2, 13 U.S.T. at 2314, 450
U.N.T.S. at 82-84 (defining freedom of high seas to include freedom of fishing); Con-
vention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, supra
note 2, art. 1, 17 U.S.T. at 140, 559 U.N.T.S. at 286-88 (recognizing states' rights to
engage in fishing high seas); William T. Burke, The Law of the Sea Convention Provisions
on Conditions of Access to Fisheries Subject to National Jurisdiction, 63 OR. L. Rv. 73 (1984)
(discussing UNCLOS III provisions concerning accessing fisheries that are subject to
national jurisdiction).
55. See UNCLOS III, supra note 2, arts. 55-58, 21 I.L.M. at 1280 (defining exclusive
economic zones ("EEC") as extending no farther than 200 miles and entitling coastal
states certain sovereign rights, jurisdiction, and duties); see also BowETr, supra note 45,
at 5 (arguing indisputability of 1958 and 1960 Conventions' inability to complete codifi-
cation of law of sea because each left open questions concerning breadth of territorial
sea and exclusive fishery zones); Jonathan I. Charney, Entry Into Force of the 1982 Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, 35 VA.J. INT'L L. 381, 383-85 (1995) (arguing that entry into
force of UNCLOS III would stabilize and clarify international ocean regimes such as
territorial sea, transit passage, EEZs, and coastal state legislative authority over living
and non-living resources as well as environment).
56. UNCLOS I1, supra note 2, pmbl., 21 I.L.M. at 1271. UNCLOS III's preamble
suggests multiple reasons for the third conference. Id. For example, developments
since the 1958 and 1960 Conferences accentuated the need for a new and generally
acceptable codification on the law of the sea. Id. Furthermore, state parties to the
Convention recognized
the desirability of establishing through this Convention, with due regard for
the sovereignty of all States, a legal order for the seas and oceans which will
facilitate international communication, and will promote the peaceful uses of
the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of their resources,
the conservation of their living resources, and the study, protection and pres-
ervation of the marine environment ....
Id.
In addition, a 1978 report for use by the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
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United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea convened in
1975. 57
Transportation during the second session of the 95th Congress details other motivating
factors. 95TH CONG. LOSC, supra note 46, at 9. For instance, modern drilling technol-
ogy expanded continental shelf claims deeper and outward. Id. Supertankers and nu-
clear submarines caused difficulties with regards to innocent passage of foreign flag
vessels through territorial waters of coastal states. Id. Specifically, national security and
environmental protection concerns necessitated further regulation. Id. Modern ad-
vancements in navigation and harvesting techniques strained commercial fisheries. Id.
Giant fishing factories and processing ships intensified this difficulty. Id. Progression
in mineral discovery and exploitation demanded a legal regime with regards to areas
beyond coastal states continental shelfjurisdiction. Id.
A 1967 statement to the United Nations by Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta high-
lights a general concern, in light of mankind's newfound technological capabilities,
that unilateral exploitation of the deep seabed be prohibited. See U.N. GAOR 1st
Comm., 22d Sess., 1515 mtg., U.N.Doc.A/C.1/PV/1515 (1967) (discussing importance
of ocean resources and impact exploitation of ocean resources will have on mankind as
well as emphasizing that modern-day technological capabilities to exploit ocean necessi-
tates updated law of sea). Consequently, but not without controversy, UNCLOS III es-
tablished a comprehensive system regulating the exploitation of deep seabed mineral
resources. UNCLOS III, supra note 2, part XI, 21 I.L.M. at 1293-1308. Notably, a 1994
compromise at a Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly reinterpreted
UNCLOS III's provisions on deep seabed mining to produce ratification by the United
States and other major industrial countries. Agreement Relating to the Implementa-
tion of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 Decem-
ber 1982, opened for signature July 28, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1309 (entered into force July 28,
1996).
57. UNCLOS II1, supra note 2, 21 I.L.M. at 1261. UNCLOS III is an extensive
document covering a wide range of maritime subjects. Id. UNCLOS III contains 320
articles and nine annexes. Id. One scholar contends that UNCLOS III's comprehen-
sive scope distinguishes it from all preceding maritime law treaties. Yankov, supra note
46, at 16. UNCLOS III's framework governs all ocean space as well as the seas' primary
uses and natural resources. See id. (describing UNCLOS III's broad governance includ-
ing "the conduct of marine scientific research and protection of marine activities, such
as navigation, fisheries, exploitation of oil, gas and other minerals from the seabed and
ocean floor, preservation of the marine environment, conduct of marine scientific in-
vestigation and development of marine technology."). One ambassador enumerated
UNCLOS III's notable improvements from the 1958 Conventions:
1. the concept of transit passage through straits used for international naviga-
tion;
2. the concept of archipelagic baselines and archipelagic waters;
3. the concept of the exclusive economic zone;
4. fundamental change in the definition of the legal continental shelf;
5. explicit recognition of the freedom of scientific research and of the free-
dom to construct artificial islands and other installations as additional free-
doms of the high seas;
6. the duty of international cooperation in the development and transfer of
marine science and technology; and
7. the concept of a comprehensive environmental law of the sea based on the
obligation of all states to protect and preserve the marine environment.
Arvid Pardo, Before and After, 46 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 95, 97 (1983).
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Despite this early beginning, the 1982 Convention did not
become effective until November 16, 1994.58 As of December
31, 1996 UNLCOS III boasts 158 signatories, including Japan
and the Republic of Korea.59 The 1982 Convention entitles
coastal states to as much as 200 nautical miles of certain sover-
eign rights to living and non-living resources. 6° In addition, any
islands, 61 and in some instances rocks a 2 over which states estab-
lish sovereignty are also accorded individual maritime zones.63
58. See UNCLOS III, supra note 2, art. 308(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1327 (providing that
Convention would enter into force twelve months after sixtieth ratification or acces-
sion). Aside from waiting for a specific number of ratifications or accessions to occur,
informal negotiating and consensus decision-making processes by which UNCLOS III
was realized also belabored the progress. See Caminos & Molitor, supra note 19, at 873
(noting compromise, consensus, negotiation, and informal consultation processes that,
although laborious, produced agreements).
59. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 2, at 820 (listing 158 signatories and
110 parties to UNCLOS III). Japan signed UNCLOS III on February 7, 1983 and rati-
fied it on June 20, 1996. Id. The Republic of Korea signed UNCLOS III on March 14,
1983 and ratified it on January 29, 1996. Id.
60. UNCLOS III, supra note 2, art. 56, 21 I.L.M. at 1280. Article 56, entitled
"Rights, Jurisdiction and Duties of the Coastal State in the Exclusive Economic Zone,"
provides in relevant part:
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserv-
ing and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living,
of the waters superjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its sub-
soil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation
and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the
water, currents and winds;
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Conven-
tion with regard to:
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and
structures;
(ii) marine scientific research;
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
Id.
61. See UNCLOS III, supra note 2, art. 121, 21 I.L.M. at 1291. Article 121 provides:
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is
above water at high tide.
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous
zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island
are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention appli-
cable to other land territory.
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their
own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.
Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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The 1982 Convention's debates on islands attempted, in
large part, to differentiate features such as rocks and islands.6 4
Possibilities of inequitable maritime jurisdiction generated by
minute protuberances of'seabed caused great concern.6" UN-
CLOS III, however, only vaguely defines both islands and
rocks.66  .
Article 121(3),67 a new addition to the 1982 Convention,
states that rocks unable to sustain human habitation or eco-
nomic life shall not be entitled to an EEZ.68 Notwithstanding,
64. See, e.g., Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. GAOR 2d
Comm., 2d Sess., 26th mtg., Vol. 2 at 204 (stating that according to Tunisia, island states
should have similar rights as continental states and that difficult issue of EEZs for islets
and islands necessitated additional study).
65. See, e.g., JAYEWARDENE, supra note 4, at 15 (noting primary objection that rocks,
islets, and islands, no matter how small, could possibly generate EEZs given proper
circumstances).
66. UNCLOS III, supra note 2, art. 121(1), (3), 21 I.L.M. at 1291. One maritime
scholar claims that only natural formations qualify as islands. See DEREK W. BowETT,
THE LEGAL REGIME OF ISLANDS IN' INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-7 (1979) (rejecting both artifi-
cial installations such as beacons, oil-platforms, and islands formed artificially by ac-
cumulation of sand or rubble as well as technical installations such as meteorological
stations and installations used for exploiting seabed). Although this scholar's work was
completed prior to the adoption of UNCLOS III, the actual definition of an island did
not change from the earlier 1958 Conventions. Compare Convention on the Territorial
Sea and Contiguous Zone, supra note 2, art. 10(1), 15 U.S.T. at 1609, 516 U.N.T.S. at
212 (defining island as "a naturally-formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is
above water at high tide."), with UNCLOS III, supra note 2, art. 121(1), 21 I.L.M. at
1291 (defining island as "a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is
above water at high tide."). Thus, one can assume that UNCLOS III adopted the ra-
tionale of the 1958 Conventions. See BowETT, supra, at 4 (explaining relationship be-
tween 1958, 1960, and 1982 Conventions). The United States reasoned that allowing
artificial islands individual maritime zones would encroach on the freedom of the high
seas. See id. at 4 (noting United States' motion to insert the phrase "naturally-formed"
before "area of land").
Other scholars define islands, islets, and rocks mathematically. KAPOOR & KERR,
supra note 2, at 67-9. The International Hydrographic Bureau defines small islets as
one to 10 square kilometers, isles as 10 to 100 square kilometers, and islands as 100 to
1,000,000 square kilometers. Id. at 68. Accordingly, rocks likely would be less than one
square kilometer. Id. Another scholar categorized rocks as less than .001 square miles,
islets between .001 square miles and one square miles, isles between one and 1,000
square miles, and islands as larger than 1,000 square miles. Islands: Normal and Special
Circumstances, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE PUBLICATION 17 (1973).
67. UNCLOS III, supra note 2, 21 I.L.M. at 1291.
68. UNCLOS III, supra note 2, art. 121(3), 21 I.L.M. at 1291. The addition of
rocks that can sustain human habitation or economic life to the island regime is signifi-
cant because no such provision existed in the 1958 Conventions. See Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, supra note 2, art. 10, 15 U.S.T. at 1609-10, 516
U.N.T.S. at 212 (stating only that islands are naturally-formed areas of land surrounded
by water and entitled to territorial sea).
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the 1982 Convention does not explicitly define human habita-
tion or economic life.69 One maritime scholar suggests that the
absence of sweet water"° might indicate uninhabitability.71 The
same scholar questions whether providing mainland assistance
such as a desalination plant or other supplies to the rock would
satisfy the criteria of Article 121 (3).72 Thus, one important ques-
tion left unanswered by UNCLOS III is whether rocks need to
provide human habitation or economic life independent of
outside assistance to qualify for an EEZ.73
2. Territorial Acquisition
No unanimity exists within the international community re-
ghrding territorial-acquisition methods.7 1 Customary interna-
tional law, however, provides five traditionally-recognized
modes. 75 These means play an important role in resolving sover-
69. UNCLOS III, supra note 2, art. 121(3), 21 I.L.M. at 1291; see e.g., Barry Hart
Dubner, The Spratly "Rocks" Dispute - A "Rockapelago" Defies Norms of International Law, 9
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. LJ. 291, 303 (1995) (stating that Article 121(3) is new addition to
island regime of UNCLOS III with ambiguous and vague language). In reference to
Article 121(3), the ICJ concluded,
[w]hen the Law of the Sea Convention spelt out in Article 121(3) that
rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own
shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf, it was perhaps
giving expression to the concept that population and economic life are rele-
vant to the enjoyment of exclusive economic zones and continental shelf enti-
tlements. It was not rocks per se that were excluded from these rights but
rocks which lacked the possibility of sustaining habitation or economic life,
thus indicating the importance of these factors in attracting exclusive eco-
nomic zone and continental shelf entitlements, in an appropriate case.
Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Area Between Greenland and Jan
Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38, 269 (June 14).
70. See e.g., 27 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DIcrTIoN~AY 392 (2d ed. 1989) (explaining
that sweet-water or sweetwater, with hyphen or as one word, means. "living in or consist-
ing of fresh water" and that sweet water, as two words, means ["f]resh water").
71. 1 E.D. BROWN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 150 (Introductory Manual
1994).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Compare 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 678-708 (Robert Jennings & Ar-
thur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter OPPENHEIM] (recognizing, defining, and dis-
cussing cession, occupation, accretion, subjugation, and prescription as methods of ter-
ritorial acquisition), with I D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAw 405-43 (2d ed. 1970)
(recognizing, defining, and discussing occupation, historic title rights created in dero-
gation of international law through historical processes, prescription, accretion, annex-
ation, cession, and debellatio as methods of territorial acquisition).
75. See, e.g., OPPENHEIM, supra note 74, at 679 (defining and discussing cession,
occupation, subjugation, prescription, and accretion as traditional means for acquiring
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eignty disputes.76
Cession 77 of state territory is the peaceful transfer of terri-
tory by the owner-state to another state.7' Agreement effectuates
cession.7 9 In addition, the ceding state must intend to relinquish
and pass sovereignty and the receiving state must intend to ac-
cept it.8 ° Agreements imposed by certain types of force, how-
ever, may be void due to Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties which nullifies treaties procured by the
threat or use of force.81
Prescription 2 is the process of acquiring territory through a
continuous and undisturbed exercise of sovereignty lasting long
enough to create a general conviction that the possession con-
territory). Although accretion likely will not be implicated with regard to Liancourt, it
is an "increase of land through new formations." Id. at 696. New formations may only
modify or enlarge existing state territory. Id. Furthermore, accretion may be artificial
or natural. Id. As regards the various modes that international law recognizes as valid
means to create title to territory, one legal scholar suggests that they all have the follow-
ing common feature: "the importance, both in the creation of title and of its mainte-
nance, of actual effective control." R.Y. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 4 (1963).
76. See e.g., Charney, supra note 9, at 728 (explaining that in addition to decisions
of international adjudicatory bodies, methods of territorial acquisition such as occupa-
tion, conquest, and prescription substantially contribute to resolving territorial dis-
putes).
77. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 74, at 679 (defining cession as "the transfer of sover-
eignty over state territory by the owner-state to another state."); see also O'CONNELL,
supra note 74, at 436 (defining cession as ["t]he peaceful transfer of territory from one
sovereign to another .... ").
78. OPPENHEIM, supra note 74, at 679; O'CONNELL, supra, note 74, at 436.
79. See, e.g., OPPENHEIM, supra note 74, at 680 (discussing that cession can only be
effected in agreements between either ceding and acquiring state or several states in-
cluding ceding and cessionary states).
80. See O'CONNELL, supra note 74, at 436 (maintaining immateriality of convey-
ance's form so long as exists unimpeachable intent to convey and receive territory).
81. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 52, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 344 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Article 52, entitled "Coercion of a
State by the Threat or Use of Force," provides that ["a] treaty is void if its conclusion
has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of interna-
tional law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations." Id. Japan acceded to the
Vienna Convention on July 2, 1981 and the Republic of Korea signed it on November
27, 1969 and ratified it on April 27, 1977. MULTILATERAL TREATIES supra note 2, at 869.
82. OPPENHEIM, supra note 74, at 706. As regards the often blurry distinction be-
tween occupation and prescription, one scholar notes that international tribunals do
not always indicate the grounds upon which they proceed. R.Y.JENNINGS, supra note 75,
at 23. Furthermore, the ultimate results of territorial disputes based on either prescrip-
tion or occupation will often be synonymous because each acquisitional method is an
"ultimate realization] [ of an existing effective possession and control." Id.
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forms with international order.8" No general rules govern the
necessary length of time to substantiate a prescription claim.84 If
other states protest the acquiring state's activity, however, this
type of action not only disturbs the exercise of sovereignty, but
also disrupts international order.85
Subjugation,86 often referred to as title by conquest,87 is the
act by which one state acquires territory by conquest followed by
annexation.88 Because victors often enforce cession agreements,
subjugation is rare.89 As previously stated, choosing to enforce a
cession results in the possible application of Article 52 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.90
83. OPPENHEIM, supra note 74, at 706. One scholar argues:
There is no doubt that, in international practice, a state has been considered
to be the lawful owner even of those parts of its territory of which originally it
took possession wrongfully, provided that the possessor has been in undis-
turbed possession for so long as to create the general conviction that the pres-
ent condition of things is in conformity with international order.
Id.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 706-07 (arguing that protests and territorial claims disrupt requisite
characteristics of prescription of undisturbed exercise of sovereignty and conviction
that things conform with international order).
86. See, e.g., OPPENHEIM, supra note 74, at 698 (defining subjugation as "acquisition
of territory by conquest followed by annexation, and often called tide by conquest, had
to be accepted into the scheme of modes of acquisition of title to territorial sovereignty
in the period when the making of war was recognised as a sovereign right, and war was
not illegal."). One expert argues further that two conditions precedent must exist for a
valid annexation. O'CONNELL, supra note 74, at 435. The first condition is the extinc-
tion of sovereignty, which means that the annexed state no longer has the capacity to
act internationally. Id. The second condition is that,
annexation follows conquest, and by conquest is meant the effective control of
the conquered territory in such circumstances as to warrant the presumption
that the control will be permanent. In other words, while there remains the
reasonable possibility of the former sovereign recovering his territory annexa-
tion is not permitted by international law .... In effect this rule has come to
mean that annexation is possible only after war has terminated.
Id.
87. See Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No.53, at 47 (Apr. 5) [hereinafter Eastern Greenland] (explaining that conquest only
causes loss of sovereignty when there is war between two states and defeat of one state
results in sovereignty passing from losing to victorious state).
88. O'CONNELL, supra note 74, at 435. See id. at 432-33 (providing complete discus-
sion about distinction between conquest and annexation).
89. OPPENHEIM, supra note 74, at 699.
90. See id. (describing circumstances in which Article 52 would apply such as pro-
curing treaties by use or threat of force); Vienna Convention, supra note 81, art. 52, at
344.
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Occupation 9' is a state's intentional appropriation of sover-
eignty over territory treated as a terra nullius.9 2 Acquiring states
effectuate occupation by taking possession of, and establishing
an administration over, the acquired territory.9" To constitute a
valid claim to territory based on occupation, occupation must be
effective.94
3. Case Law and Arbitral Decisions
Japan and the Republic of Korea may resolve their dispute
over Liancourt by any peaceful means they desire.95 Yet resolv-
ing the dispute necessitates a comparison of the facts of this case
with relevant existing precedent. 96 Several decisions by interna-
tional adjudicatory bodies provide an analytical framework for
91. See, e.g., OPPENHEIM, supra note 74, at 686 (defining occupation as "the act of
appropriation by a state by which it intentionally acquires sovereignty over such terri-
tory as is at the time not under the sovereignty of another state."); see generally
O'CONNELL, supra note 74, at 408-09 (discussing historical origins of occupation from
perspective of colonial expansion).
92. See, e.g., O'CONNELL, supra note 74, at 410-11 (giving example of international
arbitration in which disputed territory was a terra nullius and thus susceptible to occupa-
tion). Terra nullius or territorium nullius is territory that does not belong to any state. See
OPPENHEIM, supra note 74, at 687 (defining terra nullius as. uninhabited or inhabited
territory that does not belong to any state).
93. See OPPENIHEIM, supra note 74, at 688 (noting agreement between theory and
practice that occupation is effected by taking possession of and establishing administra-
tion over territory).
94. See id. (maintaining that possession and administration are essential to valid
effective occupation). The ICJ makes clear that claims to sovereignty "based not upon
some particular act or title such as a treaty of cession but merely upon continued dis-
play of authority, involves two elements each of which must be shown to exist: the inten-
tion and will to act as sovereign, and some actual exercise or display of such authority."
Eastern Creenland, 1933 P.C.I.J. at 45-6. One scholar contends that administration re-
quires the acquiring state to establish and exercise governmental functions over the
territory. OPPENHEIM, supra note 74, at 688. Another scholar suggests that settlement
and administration must be coupled with a presumption that the acquiring state would
exclude others by force if necessary. O'CONNELL, supra note 74, at 409. In Island of
Palmas, the PCA notes that "occupation, to constitute a claim to territorial sovereignty,
must be effective" because territories without sovereigns became relatively few during
the late 18th and 19th centuries. Island of Palmas, 2 R.I.A.A. at 846.
95. See UNCLOS III, supra note 2, arts 279-80, 21 I.L.M. at 1322 (setting forth obli-
gation to settle disputes peacefully in accordance with Article 2, paragraph 3 of U.N.
Charter and highlighting that UNCLOS III does not impair rights of parties to peace-
fully settle disputes by means of their own choice). The U.N. Charter states that ["a]ll
Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner
that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered." U.N. CHARTER
art. 2, para. 3.
96. See Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v.
Hon.), 1992 I.C.J. 351, 564 (Sept. 11) [hereinafter El Salvador] (exemplifying concept of
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reaching a resolution.97
a. Island of Palmas
United States v. Netherlands98 ("Island of Palmas") involved a
dispute similar to Liancourt.99 The sole issue in the dispute be-
tween the United States and the Netherlands was the ownership
of Palmas, an island off the Philippine coast.100 Commentators
and scholars consider Island of Palmas one of the most compre-
hensive declarations on requirements states must meet when
claiming sovereignty over an island. 01
The United States based its title to Palmas on discovery and
Spain's subsequent cession of the Philippines to the United
States pursuant to the Treaty of Paris. 102 At that time, Spain had
sovereign rights over the Philippines, thus enabling the ces-
sion. 1°' The United States contended that Palmas, by virtue of
the principle of contiguity, 104 belonged to the Philippines. 105
precedent by relying on earlier ICJ decision to conclude that evidence of possession of
disputed territory may confirm title).
97. See, e.g., Island of Palmas, 2 R.I.A.A. at 838-40 (setting forth contemporary inter-
national law, such as intertemporal law and effective occupation, that is applicable to
acquiring sovereignty over offshore territory).
98. Island of Palmas, 2 R.I.A.A. at 829.
99. Id.
100. Island of Palmas, 2 R.I.A.A. at 831. The United States referred to the island as
the Island of Palmas. Id. at 835. The Netherlands, however, referred to the island as
the Island of Miangas. Id. at 835-36.
101. See Brian K. Murphy, Comment, Dangerous Ground: The Spratly Islands and In-
ternational Law, 1 OcEAN & COASTAL LJ. 187, 198 (1995) (contending that Island of
Palmas is one of most comprehensive judicial statements on requirements for state to
claim sovereignty over island); Charney, supra note 9, at 728 (recognizing that Island of
Palmas is largely responsible for establishing basic contemporary international law on
acquiring territorial sovereignty such as relativity of requisite manifestations of sover-
eignty, effective occupation, and intertemporal law).
102. Id. at 837; Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10, 1898, U.S.-Spain, 30 Stat. 1754.
103. Island of Palmas, 2 R.I.A.A. at 837. The United States argued that establishing
facts showing an actual display of sovereignty over Palmas was unnecessary because of
the cession agreement between Spain and the United States. Id.
104. Id. at 854. Addressing the contiguity claim, the PCA stated:
Although States have in certain circumstances maintained that islands rela-
tively close to their shores belonged to them in virtue of their geographical
situation, it is impossible to show the existence of a rule of positive interna-
tional law to the effect that islands situated outside territorial waters should
belong to a State from the mere fact that its territory forms the terra firma
(nearest continent or island of considerable size).
105. Id. at 837.
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The Netherlands, on the other hand, based its claim on the colo-
nization of Palmas by the Dutch East India Company1°6 and on
the subsequent uninterrupted and peaceful exercise of sover-
eignty over Palmas.' °7 The Netherlands further maintained that
it, along with the Dutch East India Company, concluded a series
of treaties with native princes making the Netherlands Palmas's
feudal overlord.'0 8
Prior to considering the claimants' arguments, the Perma-
nent Court of Arbitration.0 9 ("PCA") outlined the applicable
substantive law concerning the acquisition of territorial sover-
eignty.110 Accordingly, the PCA stressed the importance of con-
tinuous and peaceful11. displays of sovereignty.1 2 Rejecting the
United States' claims of discovery and contiguity, the PCA
awarded Palmas to the Netherlands concluding that discovery,
per se, is insufficient to establish sovereignty over an island. 1
Although granting that discovery gives a state inchoate title to a
disputed territory, the PCA held that effective occupation com-
106. Id. at 858. Describing the Dutch East India Company, the PCA noted that
["f]rom the end of the 16th till the 19th century, companies formed by individuals and
engaged in economic pursuits (Chartered Companies), were invested by the State to
whom they were subject with public powers for the acquisition and administration of
colonies." Id.
107. Id. at 837-38.
108. Id. at 855-56.
109. See SIMPSON & Fox, supra note 21 at 1-24 (explaining establishment of Perma-
nent Court of Arbitration ("PCA") and noting that it consists of list of arbiters available
to settle disputes).
110. Island ofPalmas, 2 R.I.A.A. at 838-40. Addressing the question of territorial
disputes, the PCA suggested,
[i]f a dispute arises as to the sovereignty over a portion of territory, it is cus-
tomary to examine which of the States claiming sovereignty possesses a title-
cession, conquest, occupation, etc-superior to that which the other State
might possibly bring forward against it. However, if the contestation is based
on the fact that the other Party has actually displayed sovereignty, it cannot be
sufficient to establish the title by which territorial sovereignty was validly ac-
quired at a certain moment; it must also be shown that the territorial sover-
eignty has continued to exist and did exist at the moment which for the deci-
sion of the dispute must be considered as critical. This demonstration consists
in the actual display of State activities, such as belongs only to the territorial
sovereign.
Id. at 838-39.
111. See id. at 839 (suggesting that peaceful, in this context, means peaceful dis-
plays of sovereignty vis-a-vis other states).
112. See id. at 838-40 (stating that peaceful and continuous displays of sovereignty
are important elements in territorial disputes).
113. Id. at 870-71.
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pletes inchoate title of the territory claimed to have been discov-
ered. 14 The PCA found that in the absence of such completion,
inchoate title cannot compete against the continuous and peace-
ful display of sovereignty by another state." 5 Moreover, the PCA
noted that manifestations of sovereignty required to effectuate
occupation will vary with the nature of the territory.'
16
In addition to outlining the rules of acquiring territorial sov-
ereignty, the PCA promulgated the so-called intertemporal
law1 17 to determine what legal rules apply to particular disputes
at particular times.118 Intertemporal law maintains that prevail-
ing legal standards, that existed at the time of the title's creation,
will judge root of title, or the creation of sovereignty. 9 Yet, the
continued validity of the title must comply with international
law's continual evolution.1 20
114. Id. at 846.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 840. The PCA commented as follows regarding the relativity of effective
occupation:
Manifestations of territorial sovereignty assume, it is true, different forms,
according to conditions of time and place. Although continuous in principle,
sovereignty cannot be exercised in fact at every moment on every point of a
territory. The intermittence and discontinuity compatible with the mainte-
nance of the right necessarily differ according as inhabited or uninhabited
regions are involved, or regions enclosed within territories in which sover-
eignty is incontestably displayed or again regions accessible from, for instance,
the high seas.
Id.
117. Id. at 845. The PCA defined intertemporal law as follows:
As regards the question which of different legal systems prevailing at suc-
cessive periods is to be applied in a particular case (the so-called intertemporal
law), a distinction must be made between the creation of rights and the exist-
ence of rights. The same principle which subjects the act creative of a right to
the law in force at the time the right arises, demands that the existence of the
right, in other words its continued manifestation, shall follow the conditions
required by the evolution of law.
Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. As regards the relationship between intertemporal law and Article 52 of
the Vienna Convention, the International Law Commission ("ILC") "considered that
there is no question of the Article having retroactive effects on the validity of treaties
concluded prior to the establishment of the modern law." Report of the International
Law Commission to the General Assembly, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.9) at 74-75, U.N.
Doc. A/6309/Rev.1 (1966), reprinted in 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 253, 408 (1967) [hereinafter
ILC Report]. As previously noted, Article 52 concerns the conditions for the conclu-
sion of a legally valid treaty. Vienna Convention, supra note 75, art. 52, at 344. "An
evolution of the law governing the conditions for the carrying out of a legal act does not
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b. Clipperton Island
The arbiter in the Clipperton Island Arbitration 21 ("Clip-
perton") applied the rules for acquiring territorial sovereignty set
forth in Island of Palmas when Mexico and France reconciled
their ownership disagreement regarding Clipperton, an unpopu-
lated island in the Pacific Ocean. 122 Mexico claimed that Spain
originally discovered Clipperton and that Clipperton, therefore,
belonged to Mexico as the successor of the Spanish state. 123
France argued that it obtained title in November, 1858 as a re-
sult of a French Navy Lieutenant's discovery of Clipperton and
subsequent proclamation, declaration, and notification of the
French consulate and Hawaiian government. 24
The arbiter found no decisive proof that Spain discovered
Clipperton. 121 In fact, the arbiter concluded that even if one
assumes that Spain discovered Clipperton, Mexico has not sup-
ported its discovery claims with the requisite manifestations of
sovereignty. 126 Consequently, the arbiter found Clipperton to be
operate to deprive of validity a legal act already accomplished in conformity with the
law previously in force." ILC Report, supra, at 409. Thus, Article 52 does not deprive of
validity, ab initio, treaties procured by coercion prior to the establishment of contempo-
rary law regarding the threat or use of force. Id.
As regards the operative date for the modern law prohibiting the coercion of trea-
ties by the use or threat of force, the ILC determined that Article 52 applies to all
treaties concluded since the U.N. Charter entered into force on October 24, 1945. Id.
Most international lawyers believe that Article 2, paragraph 4, along with other U.N.
Charter provisions, "authoritatively declares the modern customary law regarding the
threat or use of force." Id.; see U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4 (providing that ["a]ll Mem-
bers shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."). Yet, the ILC did not feel in-
clined to specify an operative date in the past beyond the temporal indication given by
reference in Article 52 to "'the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.'" ILC
Report, supra at 409.
121. Clipperton Island Arbitration (Mex. v. Fr.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1105 (Jan. 28, 1931),
reprinted in 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390 (1932) (hereinafter Clipperton].
122. Id.
123. See id. at 392 (setting forth that Mexico's claim that Spanish Navy discovered
Clipperton, also known as Passion, Medano, or Medanos Island and that Bull of Alexan-
der VII enforced law that gave Clipperton originally to Spain and then to Mexico in
1836).
124. Id. at 391.
125. Id. at 392-93.
126. See id. at 393 (concluding that Mexico failed to support its discovery claim
with manifestations of sovereignty, long-standing conviction that Clipperton was Mexi-
can territory was not dispositive).
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a terra nullius12 when France staked its original claim.1 28 There-
fore, as in Island of Palmas,129 the question became whether
either claimant had completed its discovery and ownership
claims by actual manifestations of sovereignty.' 30
The arbiter noted that between 1858 and 1887, neither
France nor any other power could recall any definitive acts of
sovereignty. 13 1 In November, 1897, however, French surveil-
lance uncovered three people collecting guano for a United
States' company. 3 2 Moreover, Mexico dispatched a gun-boat to
the island in December, 1897.133 As a result, Mexican officers
and marines forced the Americans to replace the hoisted U.S.
flag with the Mexican flag.'
The arbiter concluded that because Mexico engaged in only
the mere symbolic act of hoisting its flag, it failed to display the
requisite peaceful and continuous acts of sovereignty. 35  In
granting Clipperton to France, the arbiter found that France
manifested such sovereignty on the basis of a formal proclama-
tion of sovereignty, a formal protest to Mexico's assertions of sov-
ereignty, a brief naval landing on Clipperton, and subsequent
127. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 74, at 687 (defining terra nullius as uninhabited or
inhabited territory that does not belong to any state).
128. Clipperton, 26 Am. J. INr'L L. at 393.
129. Island of Palmas, 2 R.I.A.A. at 829.
130. Clipperton, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. at 393.
131. Id. at 391.
132. See id. at 392 (explaining that France questioned United States which re-
sponded that it had no intention of claiming any rights to Clipperton).
133. See id. (setting forth that Mexico sent a gun-boat to Clipperton in response to
unfounded reports that England desired Clipperton).
134. Id.
135. See id. at 393 (pointing out that actual taking of possession is a condition of
effective occupation). The arbiter stated,
[t]his taking of possession consists in the act, or series of acts, by which the
occupying state reduces to its possession the territory in question and takes
steps to exercise exclusive authority there. Strictly speaking, and in ordinary
cases, that only takes place when the state establishes in the territory itself an
organization capable of making its laws respected. But this step is, properly
speaking, but a means of procedure to the taking of possession, and, there-
fore, is not identical with the latter. There may also be cases where it is unnec-
essary to have recourse to this method. Thus, if a territory, by virtue of the fact
that it was completely uninhabited, is, from the first moment when the occupy-
ing state makes its appearance there, at the absolute and undisputed disposi-
tion of that state, from that moment the taking of possession must be consid-
ered as accomplished, and the occupation is thereby completed.
Id. at 393-94.
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grant of guano.13 6 The limited amount of sovereignty manifesta-
tions required in Clipperton substantiates the PCA's statement in
Island of Palmas that the degree of sovereign acts required to es-
tablish sovereignty varies according to circumstances such as
time, place, and inhabitability of territory.1 37 Furthermore, both
Island of Palmas and Clipperton illustrate that in the case of unin-
habited areas, little is required by way of displaying actual physi-
cal authority over the territory to effectuate possession. 3
c. Minquiers
France v. United Kingdom 39 ("Minquiers") involved a dispute
concerning the islets and rocks of the Minquiers and Ecrehos
groups in the English Channel.14 ° Each claimant maintained
that it had original title to the disputed territory and that it had
confirmed its title by effective possession.1 4 The United King-
dom asserted title by conquest and subsequent confirmation of
title on the basis of treaties concluded between England and
France. 42 The United Kingdom contended that it substantiated
its claims to original title with continuous displays of sovereignty
over the disputed territory. 4 3 France also claimed original title,
contending that English Kings held the disputed territory in fee
of French Kings. 4 France furthered its assertion by claiming
136. Id. at 391-92.
137. See Island ofPalmas, 2 R.I.A.A. at 840 (explaining relativity of affirmative acts
required to manifest sovereignty).
138. See O'CONNELL, supra note 74, at 411 (stating in reference to Island of Palmas
and Clipperton that with uninhabited territories little physical control over territory is
required to establish sovereign presence); see also Eastern Greenland, 1933 P.C.I.J. at 46
(noting that tribunal is often satisfied with little actual exercise of sovereign rights pro-
vided that other state cannot establish superior claim and, very often, when claims to
sovereignty are over thinly populated or unsettled countries).
139. Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K-), 1953 I.CJ. 47 (Nov. 17) [hereinafter
Minquiers].
140. Id.
141. Id. at 53; see O'CONNELL, supra note 74, at 412 (noting that ownership af-
forded victor exclusive fishing rights).
142. See Minquiers, 1953 .. C.J. at 53-54 (listing treaties concluded between United
Kingdom and France to include 1217 Treaty of Lambeth, 1259 Treaty of Paris, 1360
Treaty of Calais, and 1420 Treaty of Troyes).
143. See id. at 50, 65, 69 (finding that as regards Ecrehos and Minquiers, United
Kingdom produced evidence establishing regulation of contracts of sale, administration
of criminal proceedings, and erection and maintenance of habitable housing).
144. See id. at 56 (noting France's argument that French Court ordered KingJohn
of England to forfeit all land held in fee of King of France including Minquiers and
Ecrehos).
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that it had effectively possessed all the islets and rocks of the
Minquiers and Ecrehos groups. 14 5
Adjudging both Minquiers and Ecrehos to the United King-
dom, the ICJ refused to resolve historical, evidentiary differ-
ences.' 4 6 Instead, the ICJ focused on the importance of affirma-
tive acts of sovereignty to replace the alleged original title.'47
The ICJ, for example, attached particular value to acts related to
the exercise of jurisdiction, local administration, and legisla-
tion.' 48
d. El Salvador
In El Salvador/Honduras149 ("El Salvador'), the ICJ had to de-
cide who owned the islands of Meanguera and Meanguerita 50
The ICJ concluded that evidence based on the principle of uti
possidetis juris'5 ' was too fragmentary and ambiguous to be con-
145. See id. at 51, 70 (setting forth French assertion that France maintained lights
and buoys for more than 75 years on Minquiers without objection from the United
Kingdom, that its Prime Minister and Air Minister traveled to Minquiers to inspect
buoying, that Frenchman erected and occupied house on Minquiers, and that France
began hydro-electric projects in Minquiers region).
146. Id. at 56. Regarding the problem of using historical claims and records to
help resolve the dispute, the ICJ, alluding to intertemporal law, stated:
For the purpose of deciding the present case it is, in the opinion of the Court,
not necessary to solve these historical controversies. The Court considers it
sufficient to state as its view that even if the Kings of France did have an origi-
nal feudal title also in respect of the Channel Islands, such a title must have
lapsed as a consequence of the events of the year 1204 and following. years.
Such an alleged original feudal title of the Kings of France in respect of the
Channel Islands could to-day produce no legal effect, unless it had been re-
placed by another title valid according to the law of the time of replacement.
Id.
147. Id. at 57. Finding evidence of possession dispositive, the ICJ stated, ["w]hat is
of decisive importance, in the opinion of the Court, is not indirect presumptions de-
duced from events in the Middle Ages, but the evidence which relates directly to the
possession of the Ecrehos and Minquiers groups." Id.
148. Id. at 65.
149. El Salvador, 1992 I.C.J. at 351.
150. Id. Although questions arose as to the number of disputed islands, the ICJ
concluded that it would only address the islands of El Tigre, Meanguera, and
Meanguerita. Id. at 553-56.
151. Id. at 563. The term uti possidetis juris originated in Roman law as a writ of
recognition and sanction from the state in order to protect occupants of public land
even though they could not sustain an action for title or ownership because they could
not show original title. Libyan, 1994 I.C.J. at 83. The writ served as the occupant's tide.
Id. The legal principle became, "'Whichever party has possession of the house in ques-
tion, without violence, clandestinely or permission in respect of the adversary, the vio-
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clusory. 5 2 El Salvador differed from Island of Palmas and Clip-
perton because the disputed territory was not a terra nullius153
Nevertheless, and as it did in Island of Palmas and Clipperton, the
ICJ proceeded on the premise that the only way to confirm the
principle of uti possidetisjuris was to consider relevant manifesta-
tions of sovereignty.1 5
4
Although the ICJ awarded one island to Honduras,1 55 it
awarded Meanguera and Meanguerita to El Salvador.1 56 The ICJ
paid particular attention to the long-standing El Salvadoran
presence on Meanguera, noting an established El Salvadoran ad-
ministration. 157 Furthermore, the ICJ found that with the excep-
tion of one event, 158 there was no record of any Honduran pro-
lent disturbance of his possession [is] prohibited.'" Id. Simply put, the principle reads,
"'uti possidetis, ita possideatis"' or "'as you possess, so may you possess.' Id.
Two schools of thought have developed with regard to the interpretation of this
principle. Id. at 85. One view is that uti possidetis means "merely a juridical line or
constructive occupation - uti possidetisjuris or 'de jure."' Id. A second, less lenient view
is that "the principle must be based on a rightful and actual occupation of the territory -
uti possidetis de facto." Id.
152. El Salvador, 1992 I.C.J. at 563.
153. Id. at 564.
154. Id. at 566. The following statement by the ICJ indicates its reliance on Min-
quiers for the proposition that evidence of possession might possibly confirm claims of
historic tide:
"The present case does not therefore present the characteristics of a dis-
pute concerning the acquisition of sovereignty over terra nullius." When it
[ICJ in Minquiers] stated that "What is of decisive importance, in the opinion
of the Court, is not indirect presumptions deduced from events in the Middle
Ages, but the evidence which relates directly to the possession of the Ecrehos
and Minquiers groups," it was not assimilating the islands to terra nullius, but
examining evidence of possession as confirmatory of title.
Id. at 564-65 (citation omitted).
155. See id. at 566-70 (concluding that island of El Tigre belonged to Honduras
based on historical events and Honduras's effective occupation of El Tigre for more
than 100 years).
156. Id. at 570-79. The inhabited island of Meanguera and the uninhabited island
of Meanguerita lie in the Gulf of Fonseca and the ICJ treated them as a singular unit
because neither Honduras nor El Salvador argued otherwise. See id. at 570 (noting that
Meanguerita's small size, its contiguity to Meanguera, and its uninhabited nature "allow
its characterization as a 'dependency' of Meanguera").
157. See id. at 572-75 (highlighting thatJustice of Peace and military appointments,
issuance of licenses, elections, taxation, judicial proceedings, postal and public health
services, public works, education, and registries of birth, death, and land all evidenced
long-standing El Salvadoran presence on Meanguera).
158. See id. at 574-77 (concluding that first recorded Honduran protest against El
Salvadoran activities on Meanguera occurred on January 23, 1991 when Foreign Minis-
ter of Honduras disapproved of El Salvador's elections because dispute was currently
before ICI and modification of positions undermined juridical situation of dispute).
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test against El Salvador's activities on Meanguera. 159 Hence, the
ICJ concluded that Honduras assented to El Salvadoran sover-
eignty. 160
II. JAPAN'S AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA'S COMPETING
CLAIMS TO LIANCOURT
Japan's claims to Liancourt are mainly based on historical
documentation 6' and international law 6 2 as evidenced by twen-
tieth-century agreements with Korea,163 formal declarations of
ownership, 164 and protests to the Republic of Korea's activities
concerning Liancourt.165 Conversely, the Republic of Korea ar-
gues that it originally discovered Liancourt 66 and continues to
administer1 67 and maintain a presence thereon. 68  Moreover,
the Republic of Korea argues that following its liberation from
Japan's colonial rule, 69 Japan returned Liancourt as a result of
159. Id. at 572, 574.
160. See id. at 577 (finding that because of preceding manifestations of El Salva-
dor's sovereignty, Honduran protest came too late and Honduras's conduct, vis-a-vis El
Salvador's acts of sovereignty, revealed a tacit consent to El Salvador's presence on is-
land).
161. See Takeshima, supra note 14 (stating Japan's contention that it possesses nu-
merous documents leading up to the 19th century that provide solid foundation for its
historical claim to Liancourt).
162. See supra notes 45-160 and accompanying text (outlining various components
of international law such as UNCLOS III and decisions of international adjudicatory
bodies).
163. See, e.g., Hori, supra note 14, at 511-25 (explaining Japan's initial interest in
Liancourt during Russo-Japanese war for military purposes and subsequent incorpora-
tion of Liancourt into Shimane Prefecture by Japanese bureaucrats).
164. See, e.g., Clive Schofield, International Disputes in East Asia Escalate, 11/1/96
JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REV. 517 (1996), available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database
(outlining steps Japan has taken, because of its decision to avoid use of force, to estab-
lish its claim to Liancourt such as sending Japanese ships to disputed area).
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., Shin, supra note 14, at 333 (setting forth records such as "Annals of
the Kings of Silla" that state that Tokdo became Korean territory in 512 A.D.).
167. See Kajimura, supra note 14, at 464-65 (mentioning pre-1954 establishment of
Korean civilian garrison on Liancourt and 1954 replacement by permanent Korean po-
lice guards).
168. See S. Korea Resumes Construction on Disputed Island, REUTERS WORLD SERVICE,
Apr. 29, 1996, BC Cycle (reporting that in addition to South Korean police guarding
Liancourt since 1954, 34 maritime police and two civilians, all South Koreans, live on
Liancourt).
169. See BRIDGES, supra note 22, at 6-9 (summarizing events giving rise to and oc-
curring during Japan's 1910 to 1945 colonial rule such as Japanese attitudes of western
expansionism and subsequent "Japanisation" of Korea).
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bilateral and multilateral treaties. 170
A. Japan's Claim
The earliest Japanese records documenting the existence
and Japanese ownership of Liancourt are from 1650.171 Japan
asserts that numerous other pre-nineteenth century documents
provide a sound basis for its historical claim to Liancourt 1 72
Moreover, Japanese fisherman used Liancourt during the seven-
teenth173 and nineteenth centuries.'74 In addition, Japanese
hunted sea lions on Liancourt during the early-twentieth cen-
tury. 17
5
Japan also contends to have occupied Liancourt during the
Seven Years ' 76 War and Russo-Japanese 177 War for strategic pur-
poses.17' Following the Russo-Japanese War, Japan annexed Ko-
170. See Paik Choong-hyun, Japan Renews Spurious Claim to Tokto Islets, Feb. 16, 1996
(visited Feb. 1, 1998) <http://korea.emb.washington.dc.us/Kois/News/Back-
grounder/bg140.html#Concern> (also on file with the Fordham International Law Jour-
nal) (pointing to 1943 Cairo Declaration pledge that Japan would forfeit all islands it seized,
occupied, or took by force; 1945 Potsdam Declaration limiting Japanese sovereignty to three specific
islands not including Liancourt; Supreme Commander of Allied Powers directive number 677 that
specifically excluded Liancourt; and 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan in which Japan renounced
all claims to Korea).
171. See id. (indicating that Tokugawa Shogunate granted Liancourt to Ohyas and
Murakawas of Houki-Han which is known today as Tottori Prefecture).
172. Takeshima, supra note 14.
173. Hori, supra note 14, at 486.
174. Japan and South Korea: Remember the Noses, ECONOMIST, Feb. 17, 1996, at 35.
175. Hori, supra note 14, at 507.
176. See e.g., 10 THE NEw ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 259-60 (15th ed. 1994) (ex-
plaining that 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War concerned conflict between Russia and Japan
for dominance in Manchuria and Korea and noting thatJapan's victory forced Russia to
abandon its expansionist policies in Far East).
177. See e.g., id. at 666-67 (describing 1756-63 conflict between France, Austria, Sax-
ony, Sweden, and Russia on one side, and Prussia, Hanover, and Great Britain on other
side as regards not only Austrian Habsburgs attempts to win back territory from Prussia,
but also colonial struggles between Great Britain and France for control of North
America and India and noting that Seven Years' War is often called French and Indian
War).
178. See Hori, supra note 14, at 511 (noting that Japan's government found
Liancourt valuable from war execution viewpoint). Korea signed a Protocol of Alliance
with Japan on February 23, 1904 that allowed Japan to expropriate territory needed for
military purposes and guaranteed Korean independence. Id. Accordingly, Japan con-
structed a watchtower on Liancourt that was completed on August 19, 1905. Id. at 513-
14. The watchtower, however, was removed after the Russo-Japanese War. See Shin,
supra note 14, at 354 (noting that following alleged Japanese incorporation of
Liancourt into Shimane Prefecture in 1905, watchtower constructed by Japanese navy
was removed).
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rea in a series of agreements made between 1905 and 1910.119
During this period, Japan specifically reaffirmed its claim to
Liancourt by officially incorporating Liancourt into the Shimane
Prefecture. s ° As part of the annexation, Japan contends that all
179, CHoi, supra note 36, at 117-19. The most significant treaties aiding Japan in
its annexation of Korea include the November 17, 1905 agreement that transferred
control of Korean external relations to Japan, the July 24, 1907 agreement in which the
Korean Administration was transferred to Japan, and the August 22, 1910 agreement
and subsequent effectuation of the complete and total Japanese annexation of Korea.
Id. Japan's takeover of Korea, however, was met by tremendous Korean resistance in-
cluding the Samil Uprising of 1919, the June 10, 1926 Mansei Incident, and 1929
Kwangju Students Incident. Id. at 85. Despite Korea's opposition, the superpowers
chose not to intercede in Japanese-Korean affairs. See id. at 45 (explaining that out of
Great Britain, Russia, and United States, not one objected to Japan's absorption of Ko-
rea). According to one scholar, Great Britain endorsed Japan's influence in Korea as a
check on Russia and as a protection of Great Britain's commercial and territorial inter-
ests in the East. Id. This scholar further asserts that Russia consented to Japan's control
of Korea "as her war indemnity," and that the United States' position as an arbitrator
between Russia and Japan motivated its choice not to intercede. Id.
180. See id. (noting 1905 cabinet decision and subsequent Shimane Prefecture
proclamation to incorporate Liancourt); see also Kajimura, supra note 14, at 456-61
(pointing outJanuary 28, 1905 cabinet decision and February 22, 1905 Shimane Prefec-
ture Notice 40 that Liancourt belonged to Japan). Another Japanese opinion of the
1905 incorporation of Liancourt into the Shimane Prefecture holds that Liancourt was
a terra nullius and therefore subject to occupation. See Hori, supra note 14, at 524 (con-
cluding thatJapan justifies its 1905 incorporation of Liancourt as either reconfirmation
of title held since early modern times or as occupying terra nullius); see also My-Young
Ahn, South Koreans Upset at Japanese Claim to Remote Island, I)EUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR,
Dec. 10, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database (noting thatJapan bases its
claim to Liancourt on Shimane Prefecture Notice 40 issued on February 22, 1905 which
stated that Liancourt was terra nullius and declared Liancourt part of Shimane Prefec-
ture). The Shimane Prefecture is ajapanese Prefecture on Honshu, the main Japanese
island. Japan in Fresh Dispute with South Korea over Mini-Island, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGEN-
TUR, Feb. 9, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database. In response to Korean
assertions that the 1905 incorporation was an imperialistic act of aggression by Japan,
Japan counters that the Korean assertions are unfounded, cannot be tolerated, and are
denunciative of Japan as a sovereign state. Kajimura, supra note 14, at 456-57. Japan
did not inform Korea of the incorporation until March 1906. Id. at 458.
The Republic of Korea has a two-fold response to Japan's claim of incorporating
Liancourt into the Shimane Prefecture in 1905. Lee, supra note 25, at 352-53. The
Republic of Korea asserts that historical documentation proves that Liancourt belonged
to Korea prior to Japan's alleged 1905 incorporation, thereby refuting Japan's conten-
tions that Liancourt was a terra nullius. Id. Further, the Republic of Korea contends
thatJapan knew that Korea exercised sovereignty over Liancourt and, therefore, Japan's
failure to notify Korea immediately of its professed acquisition violated international
law and practice. Id. Yet, a recent news service notes that the 1905 incorporation oc-
curred whileJapan already had control of Korea's external affairs as part of the annexa-
tion process. Japan Ready to go to World Court to Solve Island Dispute with South Korea,
ACENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 22, 1996 available in WESTIAW, Allnewsplus Database.
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Korean territory became Japanese.18 1  One international-law
scholar maintains that the Japanese annexation of Korea con-
sisted of a peaceful, voluntary, negotiated merging of both coun-
tries. 182
Japan interprets the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951183
as a more recent acknowledgment of Japan's sovereignty over
Liancourt.18 4 Furthermore, Japan's confidence in its position
surfaced when it threatened to refer the dispute to the ICJ in
September 1954.185 Since then, Japan habitually sends an an-
nual notice to the Republic of Korea to remind Seoul of Japan's
continued claim to Liancourt. l8 6 Japan also regularly sends Mar-
itime Safety Agency vessels to the disputed area in order to dis-
play the Japanese flag.18 7 Currently, the official Japanese posi-
tion is to work towards a peaceful settlement with the Republic
of Korea.' 88
B. The Republic of Korea's Claim
The earliest written Korean documentation states that
Liancourt became part of Korea in 512 A.D.' 89 Korean experts
181. CHoi, supra note 36, at 135-39. Article I of the 1,910 Annexation Treaty reads:
"His Majesty the Emperor of Korea makes complete and permanent cession to his Maj-
esty the Emperor of Japan of all rights of sovereignty over the whole of Korea." Id. at
137. Article II reads: "His Majesty the Emperor ofJapan accepts the cession mentioned
in the preceding Article and consents to the complete annexation of Korea to the Em-
pire of Japan." Id.
182. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 74, at 681-82 (citing examples of cessions based on
voluntary mergers such as Duchy of Courland ceding its territory to Russia in 1795 and
Free Town of Mulhouse merging into France in 1798).
183. Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 40, at 3169, 136 U.N.T.S. at 45.
184. Id. The Treaty of Peace with Japan, signed at San Francisco on September 8,
1951, was an attempt by the Allied Powers and Japan to resolve outstanding questions
from World War II. Id. at 3171, 136 U.N.T.S. at 46. The second chapter covers
problems relating to territory. Id. art. 2-4, at 3172-74, 136 U.N.T.S. at 48-52. Article
2(a) reads: 'Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title
and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet." Id.
art. 2(a), at 3172, 136 U.N.T.S. at 48. Because there is no specific reference to
Liancourt, Japan claims it never returned Liancourt to Korea. See Kajimura, supra note
14, at 461-62 (designating islands as Chejudo, Komundo, and Ullungdo as opposed to
Quelpart, Port Hamilton, and Dagelet and noting Japan's argument that because
Treaty did not specifically mention Liancourt, it was excluded from Korean territory).
185. Takeshima, supra note 14.
186. Schofield, supra note 164.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See, e.g., Shin, supra note 14, at 333 (describing that written records on
Liancourt are found in Samguk sagi or "History of the Three Kingdoms").
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claim that numerous eighth-century historical records prove that
Liancourt was not only part of the Choson Dynasty190 of Korea,
but also a part of Choson's predecessors, the Silla and Koryo
Kingdoms.191 In addition, the Republic of Korea asserts that nu-
merous maps verify its title to both Liancourt 92 and its larger
neighbor, the island of Ullungdo, of which the Republic of Ko-
rea argues Liancourt is an appendage. 193 Koreans argue that
they have continually protested Japanese activity in the disputed
area. 194  Although Ullungdo was continually inhabited,
Liancourt appears to have remained uninhabited.19
The Republic of Korea maintains that following World War
II, Japan returned Liancourt as a result of the 1943 Cairo Decla-
ration19 6 and 1945 Potsdam Proclamation"" which ended Japa-
190. See id. 334-37 (explaining role Choson dynasty government played in adminis-
tering Liancourt and neighboring island Ullungdo). For example, the Chosen dynasty
government evacuated Korean nationals because of a threat by Japanese pirates, insti-
gated and maintained a vacant island policy under which both Ullungdo and Liancourt
remained uninhabited, and published a geographic compilation of Korea. Id.
191. See id. at 333-34 (noting written records documenting Liancourt as Korean
territory traced to Kings of Silla and mentioning increase in Japanese pirates toward
end of Koryo).
192. See Lee, supra note 25, at 392 (setting forth that 1678-1752 Tongguk chido
(Map of Korea), 1821-46 Choson chondo (Complete Map of Korea), and Haejwa
chondo map of 1822 indicate exact location of Liancourt to side of Ullungdo).
193. See id. (explaining that Liancourt is islet appendant to Ullungdo).
194. See id. at 342 (relating 17th-century incident in which Koreans chased Japa-
nese fishermen from Liancourt because Korea prohibited Japanese from living on the
island).
195. See id. at 348-50 (detailing Ullungdo population as of March 1897 to consist of
662 males and 472 females dwelling in 397 houses in 12 villages).
196. The Cairo Declaration, Dep't St. Bull., Dec. 4, 1943, at 393, 3 Bevans 858. At
the 1943 Cairo Conference, the United States, China, and Great Britain pledged that
Korea would become free and independent of Japan:
The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the
aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought
of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all
the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning
of the first World War in 1914 .... Japan will also be expelled from all other
territories which she has taken be violence and greed. The aforesaid three
great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are deter-
mined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.
Id.
197. The Potsdam Proclamation Defining Terms forJapanese Surrender, Dep't St.
Bull., July 29, 1945, at 137, 3 Bevans 1204. The Potsdam Declaration reaffirmed the
multilateral pledge made at Cairo: "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried
out and Japanese Sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Ky-
oshu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine." Id. at 1205(8). Shortly there-
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nese rule of Korea. a " Shortly thereafter, argues the Republic of
Korea, the Allied Powers issued Supreme Command for Allied
Powers Instruction Numbers 677199 ("SCAPIN No. 677") and
1033200 ("SCAPIN No. 1033") which exclude Liancourt from Jap-
anese jurisdiction and proscribe Japanese activity in the disputed
area.
201
Subsequent to Japan's relinquishment of control over Ko-
after, Korea was officially liberated from Japan's 36-year rule. CHOI, supra note 36, at
120.
198. Id. The Republic of Korea contends that the period prior to Korea's libera-
tion at the close of World War II, and specifically the period prior to the 1910 Annexa-
tion Treaty, evidenced Japan's insatiable imperialistic appetite. See Bradley Martin &
Yoshiko Matsushita, Politics Behind Japan Sea Claim, ASIA TIMES, Feb. 16, 1996, at 1 (not-
ing Republic of Korea's argument thatJapan manipulated Korea's government several
years prior to 1910); see also Robert Guest, Korea Furious After Japan Lays Claim to Fishing
Isles, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 15, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database
(stating thatJapan overtook Liancourt during period in which Japan held royal Korean
family hostage). The Republic of Korea further argues that Japan imposed itself on
Korea by force. HILARY CONROY, TrIE JAPANESE SEIZURE OF KOREA 1868-1910: A STUDY
OF REALISM AND IDEALISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 347 (1960). Referencing the
February 26, 1876 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and Korea, one
scholar maintains that "Korea was compelled to sign the treaties under threat of war."
CHoI, supra note 36, at 10. Referring to Japanese negotiations with the Korean foreign
ministry, this scholar continues, ["t]he Japanese used every kind of reasoning, offered
... bribes, cajoled ... and threatened to kill them if they refused to yield." Id. at 47.
Another bold statement reveals "that the single factor which brought about the fall of
the Korean nation was the use of ruthless, inhumane, and unjustifiable methods by the
Japanese to accomplish their objectives in Korea." Id. at 82.
The same scholar argues the United States did not intervene because it was acting
as an arbitrator between Japan and Russia. Id. at 45. Referencing Russia and Great
Britain, the author states, "Russia consented to Japan's domination of Korea as her war
indemnity, and Great Britain welcomed the advance of the influence of Japan so as to
checkmate Russian influence and protect her commercial, as well as territorial, interests
in the East." Id. Furthermore, Japan signed a convention with Russian pledging non-
intervention in each other's spheres of influence.. Id. at 74.
199. Government and Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from
Japan: Supreme Command for Allied Powers Instruction No. 677, Jan. 29, 1946 (limit-
ingJapan's territory to islands of Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu, Shigoku, and about 1,000
smaller islands). Clause 5 specifically excluded Ullungdo, Liancourt, and Chejudo. Id.
200. Memorandum Concerning the Establishment of the MacArthur Line:
Supreme Command for Allied Powers Instruction No. 1033, June 22, 1946 (prohibiting
Japanese ships from coming within 12 nautical miles of Liancourt).
201. Id. Japan's counter argument to SCAPIN No. 677 and 1033 is that they are
not final dispositions of Liancourt. Kajimura, supra note 14, at 461-62 (addressing Ja-
pan's reliance on 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty and noting that because Treaty did
not specifically include Japanese renunciation of Liancourt, it remained Japanese terri-
tory).
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rea, Liancourt housed its first Korean inhabitants." 2 Since then,
there has been a continual Korean presence on Liancourt of at
least one or two fishing families and a permanent coastguard.2 °3
The Republic of Korea has also taken numerous steps to develop
the disputed area.2 °4
In late 1995, the Republic of Korea began building harbor
facilities as authorized by the Korean Maritime and Port Admin-
istration.20 5 In addition, the Republic of Korea announced plans
in early 1996 to install a water treatment plant on Liancourt to
convert sea water into potable water.20 6 In March 1996, the Re-
public of Korea lifted an existing ban on tourism in the disputed
area. 20 7 Moreover, as part of a project to upgrade navigational
aid facilities, South Korean officials set aside US$86,000 to refur-
bish a South Korean lighthouse on Liancourt.20 8 The refurbish-
ment is intended to enhance the range of the lighthouse from
seventeen to more than twenty-six nautical miles.20 9 Currently,
the Republic of Korea's official position is that Liancourt is in-
herently Korean and may therefore not become the subject of a
territorial dispute.210
202. See GUEST, supra note 198 (stating that Liancourt's first inhabitants, all Kore-
ans, arrived in mid-20th century).
203. Id.
204. See, e.g., South Korea Builds Harbor Facilities on Disputed Island, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Feb. 8, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database (reporting that Re-
public of Korea's constructed and continues to maintain, harbor facilities on
Liancourt).
205. See S. Korea Resumes Construction on Disputed Island, supra note 158 (reporting
estimated harbor facilities investment around US$19.74 million).
206. See Shim Sung-won, S. Korea Risks New Island Flare-up Over Water Plant, REUTERS
FIN. SERVICE, Feb. 22, 1996 (reporting South Korean plans to install water treatment
plan on Liancourt that can transform five tons of water per day, enough for 50 people).
207. See South Korea Allows First Group of Tourists to Disputed Islets, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Mar. 12, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database (reporting ferry
carrying 700 tourists to Liancourt).
208. See South Korea to Boost Range of Lighthouse on Disputed Islets, AGENCE FRANCE
PREssE, Dec. 12, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database (outlining South
Korean lighthouse reinforcement plans).
209. See id. (reciting South Korean plans to boost lighthouse range).
210. Lee, supra note 25, at 390.
1998] 1639
1640 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol.21:1606
III. THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA ESTABLISHES A SUPERIOR
CLAIM TO LIANCOURT THAN DOES JAPAN AMD
SHOULD THEREFORE BECOME
LIANCOURT'S SOVEREIGN
To achieve the maximum jurisdictional sovereignty the 1982
Convention affords, the claimants must first establish sovereignty
over Liancourt according to internationaily-recognized stan-
dards.21  Thereafter, the dispute will likely concern Liancourt's
characterization as an island, or a rock capable of sustaining
human habitation or economic life under Article 121.212 If the
victor can meet Article 121's criteria, then Liancourt can readily
generate individual maritime zones.2 t3
A. According to Public International Law, the Republic of Korea Has
a Stronger Claim to Liancourt Than Does Japan
Considering the evidence presented, the Republic of Korea
establishes a stronger claim to Liancourt because it has mani-
fested greater affirmative acts of sovereignty on and around the
disputed area than has Japan. Arguments that Korea acquired
Liancourt as a result of a particular method of territorial acquisi-
tion, however, will be limited. Yet, the Republic of Korea will
ably defeat any similar Japanese arguments. In addition, the Re-
public of Korea may struggle to prove that Liancourt is an ap-
pendage of Ullungdo. Therefore, considering Liancourt's am-
biguous past, the dispute will likely turn on which country has
demonstrated ownership by, manifesting relevant, affirmative
acts of sovereignty as in Island of Palmas, Clipperton, Minquiers,
and El Salvador.
1. Cession
Despite Japan's reliance on the 1910 Annexation Agree-
ment by which it argues that all Korean territory became Japa-
nese, 21 4 it is questionable whether Korea intended to relinquish
211. See supra notes 51-160 and accompanying text (detailing UNCLOS III, territo-
rial acquisition principles, and international adjudicatory body decisions).
212. See supra notes 61-73 and accompanying text (setting forth UNCLOS III's is-
land regime according to Article 121).
213. UNCLOS III, supra note 2, art. 121, 21 I.L.M. at 1291.
214. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text (setting forth Japan's argument
that Korea agreed to relinquish itself to Japanese rule).
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title and pass sovereignty as is required for a valid cession. 5 In-
deed, Korea resisted the 1905-10 annexation period with upris-
ing, protest, and a continual struggle to regain independence.216
Moreover, Korea's resistance defeats any Japanese claim that
Liancourt was the subject of a peaceful transfer of territory, an
additional cession requirement. 217 Finally, any contention that
Korea voluntarily merged into Japan as a result of peaceful nego-
tiations is simply untenable when historical scholarship is consid-
ered documenting Japan's imperialistic takeover tactics. 218
Therefore, Japanese arguments based on cession will fail.
2. Prescription
Japan and the Republic of Korea will have difficulty advanc-
ing any legitimate prescription claims. Indeed, Korea continu-
ally protested Japan's annexational rule. 21 1) Conversely, Japan
continually protests, both formally and informally, the Republic
of Korea's presence on Liancourt.22 ° Such protests undermine
prescription's requirement of an undisturbed exercise of sover-
eignty and general conviction that things are in conformity with
international order.22 Yet the superpowers'222 failure to object
to Japan's dominant influence in Korea during the several de-
cades prior to the conclusion of World War II indicates the inter-
national community's endorsement of, or acquiescence to, Ja-
pan's colonial rule.22' The international community's recogni-
tion tends to illustrate conformity with international order.22 4
. 215. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (defining and setting forth re-
quirements of cession such as intentional relinquishing and receiving of sovereignty).
216. See supra note 179 (noting Korean resistance to Japanese imperialism).
217. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (defining and setting forth ces-
sion requirements such as peaceful transfer of sovereignty from one state to another).
218. See supra note 198 (outlining historical background andJapanese-Korean rela-
tions prior to annexation period).
219. See supra note 179 (listing several Korean protests through 36-year annexation
period).
220. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text (notingJapanese protests since
mid-20th century).
221. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (discussing requirements for in-
ternationally-recognized prescription claims).
222. See CHOI, supra note 36, at 45 (listing superpowers as Great Britain, Russia,
and United States).
223. See supra note 179 (setting forth one scholar's explanation of superpowers'
choice not to intervene in Korean-Japanese affairs).
224. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (outlining process of prescrip-
tion as means of territorial acquisition).
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Furthermore, international-community recognition strengthens
a Japanese claim of prescription in light of its continuous exer-
cise of sovereignty during the thirty-six-year annexation pe-
riod.2 2 5 Japan, however, cannot demonstrate that its sovereignty
remained undisturbed by Korean protest. Thus, neither Japan
nor the Republic of Korea will prove to have acquired Liancourt
via prescription.
3. Subjugation
Japan has a strong argument that it acquired Liancourt by
subjugation.226 Indeed, to establish sovereignty based on subju-
gation, a formal annexation must follow conquest.227 Although
subjugation has always been rare,228 an international adjudica-
tory body might consider it because the law existing when the
applicable facts arose applies when judging root of title. 2 29
If the Republic of Korea is able to prove that Japan forced
Korea to cede Liancourt to Japan, however, such an act would be
cession rather than subjugation. 23 0  Hence, a Japanese claim
based on subjugation would likely fail because a valid cession re-
quires the intentional relinquishment and acceptance of sover-
eignty.23 Relinquishing sovereignty is clearly unintentional if its
transfer is compelled or coerced.
4. Occupation
Any Japanese claim to sovereignty based on occupation will
be fraught with difficulty because occupation presumes that the
occupied territory does not already belong to a state.23 2
Liancourt's history defies this presumption because it appears to
225. See supra notes 179-81, 196-201 and accompanying text (describing Japan's
annexation claim in 1910 and noting Korea liberation following World War II).
226. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (defining subjugation as method
to acquire territory).
227. See id. (outlining requirements for internationally-recognized subjugation).
228. See id. (explaining rarity of subjugation because victors of conquest and an-
nexation often enforce cession agreements).
229. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text (detailing intertemporal law set
forth in Island of Palmas).
230. See supra notes 86-90 (noting that victors of conquests followed by annexa-
tions often enforce cession agreements).
231. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (setting forth requirements for
internationally-recognized cession).
232. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (explaining that valid occupa-
tion presumes acquisition of terra nullius).
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have initially belonged to Korea.233 Indeed, Japan's assertion of
sovereignty, based on a series of agreements with Korea prior to
and including the 1910 Annexation Agreement, negates any dis-
covery-based ownership claims Japan might have because it con-
cedes a lack of initial ownership. 34
If the Republic of Korea can demonstrate that Korea had
original title based on discovery, then it has a greater chance of
establishing a completed inchoate title by effective occupation as
set out in Island of Palmas.231 Under the standard to effectuate
occupation over thinly-populated or uninhabited areas estab-
lished by Island of Palmas and Clipperton, the Republic of Korea's
manifestations of sovereignty should prove sufficient because lit-
tle is required.236
In Island of Palmas, the PCA noted that continual and peace-
ful displays of sovereignty could substantiate or complete incho-
ate title.2 37 A strict reading of such a rule appears fatal to Japa-
nese claims. 38 Japan's presence on Liancourt occurred during
times of unrest, namely during the Russo-Japanese War, Seven
Years' War, and subsequent annexation of Korea.239 Moreover,
Japan's occupation of Liancourt was not continual.24 0 Specifi-
cally, there is no indication of an actual Japanese presence on
Liancourt since the 1945 Potsdam Treaty.2 41
5. Affirmative Acts of Sovereignty
From the evidence presented, the Republic of Korea has an
enormous advantage because it effectively possesses
233. See supra notes 161-210 and accompanying text (detailing Japan's and Repub-
lic of Korea's assorted claims to Liancourt).
234. See supra notes 171-88 and accompanying text (explaining Japan's claim to
Liancourt).
235. See supra notes 98-120 and accompanying text (discussing PCA decision in
Island of Palmas).
236. See supra notes 98-138 and accompanying text (detailing Island of Palmas and
Clipperton and setting forth contemporary requirements for acquiring sovereignty over
islands).
237. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (explaining that inchoate title may
be completed by affirmative acts of sovereignty).
238. See supra notes 171-88 and accompanying text (setting forth Japan's attempts
to display affirmative acts of sovereignty).
239. See supra notes 173-82 and accompanying text (summarizing time periods in
which Japan maintained presence on Liancourt).
240. Id.
241. Id.
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Liancourt.242 Not only has the Republic of Korea constructed a
wharf, established a coastguard, refurbished a lighthouse, and
administered a continual fishing family, but also plans for
desalination plants and increased human habitation. 243  Many
territorial disputes referred to international adjudicatory bodies
highlight establishing sovereignty through affirmative actions,24 4
particularly when dealing with a terra nullius.2 45 Even when the
disputed territory is never considered a terra nullius, however, ef-
fective possession seems to prove dispositive.246
Japan may claim that formal protests such as displaying the
Japanese flag in and dispatching Japanese ships to the disputed
area are sufficient acts of sovereignty. 247 An adjudicatory body,
however, might find such acts insufficient. Recall that Mexico
attempted to substantiate its sovereignty over Clipperton by
hoisting a Mexican flag and dispatching a gun-boat to defend
the island from a threatened United Kingdom takeover.248
Nonetheless, the arbiter found these acts insufficient to establish
sovereignty. 24 To distinguish Clipperton, Japan should note the
continuity of its efforts as compared to Mexico's limited activity.,
6. Ullungdo and Liancourt as a Single Entity
The Republic of Korea's claim will also be strengthened if it
is able to prove its contention that Liancourt has consistently
been treated as an appendage of Ullungdo.25 ° In El Salvador, the
ICJ treated the uninhabited 'island of Meanguerita and the in-
habited island of Meanguera as a single insular unit.251 Compar-
242. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text (detailing steps Republic of
Korea has taken to develop Liancourt).
243. Id.
244. See supra notes 95-160 and accompanying text (discussing international adju-
dicatory bodies' decisions in Island of Palmas, Clipperton, Minquiers, and El Salvador).
245. See supra note 92 (defining terra nullius).
246. See supra notes 139-60 and accompanying text (highlighting importance of
affirmative acts of sovereignty in Minquiers and El Salvador).
247. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text (noting Japan's modern-day
attempts to publicize its claim to Liancourt).
248. See supra notes 121-38 and accompanying text (detailing Clipperton and high-
lighting Mexican attempts to establish sovereignty over disputed territory).
249. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (setting forth French manifesta-
tions of sovereignty).
250. See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text (describing Republic of Korea's
argument that Liancourt is an appendage to Ullungdo).
251. See supra note 156 (setting forth ICJ's conclusion that Meanguera and
TOKDO OR TAKESHIMA?
ing the relationship between Meanguera and Meanguerita with
that of Minquiers and the Channel Islands in Minquiers, the ICJ
wrote of Meanguerita's dependency on Meanguera, noting
Meanguerita's small size, its contiguity to Meanguera, and its
lack of inhabitants. 252 According to the Republic of Korea, these
characteristics adequately describe Liancourt's relationship to its
neighboring island Ullungdo.253 Japan, however, in an effort to
distinguish El Salvador, should note that because neither party to
the dispute treated the islands as separate entities, the ICJ was
reluctant to make the distinction.2 5 4 In addition, Island of Palmas
casts doubt on the assertion that contiguity alone proves owner-
ship.255
B. Liancourt Will Not Qualify as an Island Under Article 121
It does not appear as if Liancourt will qualify for the maxi-
mum maritime zones the 1982 Convention and Article 121 be-
StOW. 2 5 6 To do so, Liancourt's sovereign will have to demon-
strate that Liancourt is either an island or a rock capable of sus-
taining human habitation or economic life. 257  Due to the
inability of the international community to agree on a specific
definition of sustaining human habitation or economic life, such
a demonstration will be a formidable task. 58
Currently, no official clarification of Article 121(3)'s ambi-
guities exists.2 5 9 Liancourt's sovereign should argue that outside
assistance from the coastal state to meet the required standards
is not expressly prohibited by the 1982 Convention and should,
therefore, be allowed.26° Moreover, because the 1982 Conven-
tion does not specify the required level of human habitation or
Meanguerita be treated as one unit because neither El Salvador nor Honduras argued
otherwise and noting Meanguerita's dependence on Meanguera).
252. Id.
253. See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text (noting Republic of Korea's
argument that Liancourt is appendage of Ullungdo).
254. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (noting ICJ finding that neither El
Salvador nor Honduras distinguished Meanguera from Meanguerita).
255. Island ofPalmas, 2 R.I.A.A. at 854.
256. See supra notes 14, 66 and accompanying text (setting forth size of Liancourt
and various numerical definitions of rocks, isles, and islands).
257. See supra note 61 (setting forth UNCLOS III's island regime provisions).
258. See supra notes 61-73 (explaining difficulties associated with interpreting Arti-
cle 121(3)).
259. Id.
260. See supra note 61 (setting forth provisions of UNCLOS III island regime).
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economic life, the victor should argue that Liancourt continually
has supported fishermen and a coastguard, indicating at least
some level of human habitation and economic development.
261
CONCLUSION
The Republic of Korea has a stronger claim to Liancourt
than does Japan. Japan's claims rest largely on various agree-
ments with Korea, thus implying that Liancourt originally be-
longed to Korea. Accordingly, assuming Korea did originally
own Liancourt and if the Republic of Korea can prove that it
completed its original title by subsequent manifestations of sov-
ereignty, an international adjudicatory body or other third party
should find in its favor. Such a finding will undoubtedly prove a
decisive victory for the Republic of Korea. Notwithstanding, the
Republic of Korea will likely fail in its attempts to prove
Liancourt deserving of additional maritime jurisdiction under
Article 121.
261. See supra notes 161-210 and accompanying text (discussing Japanese and Ko-
rean claims that Liancourt has sustained various levels of human habitation and eco-
nomic life).
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